

The Power of Legislative Leaders*

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Abstract

Foundational theories of the legislature disagree about why, or even whether, legislative leaders are powerful, but issues of measurement and causal inference have prevented empirical work from addressing these debates effectively. To make progress, we offer a new dataset on the identities of legislative leaders in all U.S. state legislatures over the past 20 years. Using a difference-in-differences design, we show that, on average, becoming a majority-party leader causes a large increase in contributions from strategic interest groups—an indication that leaders are indeed powerful. Contrary to major theoretical predictions, however, we show that leaders are no more powerful, and possibly *less* powerful, when legislative polarization increases. Moreover, neither the size of the majority party nor the professionalization of the legislature are associated with how powerful majority-party leaders are. In contrast, we find that majority-party leaders are more powerful in bigger legislatures, which we argue suggests that a key role for leaders is solving issues of complexity and coordination. The paper thus offers new data and evidence that revises and improves our understanding of legislative politics both in the U.S. and in democratic settings more generally.

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Introduction

In legislatures across the world, members delegate some amount of *de jure* authority to a small set of individuals: legislative leaders. A variety of theories discuss the way these leaders and their parties might influence legislative activity, and if so, under what conditions they do so. To understand the role legislative leaders play—and thus to understand how our legislatures operate, what power parties do or do not possess, and how both go about the task of representing constituents—we must answer the question: are leaders powerful? In particular, in the U.S. context, do leadership positions convey power upon the individuals who hold them, separate from the individuals' pre-existing skills, talents, experience, and other characteristics? To the extent they are powerful, *why* are they powerful? What are the institutional features that increase or decrease their power? These are the key issues we study in this paper. We collect new data that allows us to study legislative leadership widely, and we demonstrate that, on average, leadership positions offer tremendous power to their possessors. But we also show that existing theories of the legislature are surprisingly unable to explain the ways the power of leadership varies across institutional contexts.

The broad literature on political leadership and legislative organization offers reasons to expect legislative leaders to wield considerable power (e.g., Aldrich and Rohde 2001; Cox and McCubbins 2005, 2007), and also reasons to expect them to wield no power at all (e.g., Krehbiel 1993, 1998). On the one hand, majority-party leaders—think in particular of the Speaker of the House—seem to possess vast powers with which to control the legislative agenda, to influence committee assignments, and to direct the majority party's goals in the legislature. It is not difficult to imagine how these powers, if vested, can aid members of the majority party seeking political goals. On the other hand, leaders can only serve as agents at the whims of their principals, the members of the legislature and of the majority party. Can a legislative body organized under the principle of majority rule ever allocate meaningful power to individuals, or are leaders only figureheads in a process that must at all turns satisfy the majority?

We contribute to this debate by bringing to bear new data and empirical approaches that allow us to measure some of the power of political leadership, separate from the power of individuals who happen to take on leadership positions. Testing these theories with data is obviously difficult. To do so, we must observe variation in leadership and in the institutional context in which leaders arise.

This is not possible at the federal level in the U.S., where we have only two units (the House and the Senate) to study. We solve this problem by constructing a new dataset from primary sources that contains the identities of all state legislators who serve as Majority-Party Leader, Speaker of the House, President of the Senate, or any similar position in the legislatures of all U.S. states, 1990–2010.

Armed with this data, we follow a longstanding tradition of measuring power *indirectly*, using a revealed-preferences argument (Ansolabehere and Snyder 1998; Snyder 1992). We use campaign contributions from donors imbued with the incentives to seek out those with power in order to determine how powerful members are. Strategic donors contribute for access (e.g., Barber N.d., 2015; Fourinaies and Hall 2014; Grimmer and Powell 2014; Kalla and Broockman N.d.; Snyder 1992), and in so doing they reveal the identities of those in the legislature they believe have the power to offer the most value to them.

Even if we find an association between leadership status and interest-group money (and thus power), can we conclude that leadership itself is what conveys this power? Or, alternatively, do the powerful rise to become leaders? We address this issue by employing a difference-in-differences design, comparing the change in the amount of contributions that candidates receive after they become leaders to the same change over the same time period among members that do not become leaders. We take pains to validate this approach, to show why the key identifying assumption of parallel trends is plausible, and to show how the results are robust to alternate empirical strategies.

Using this approach, we show that legislative leaders are indeed powerful. Strategic groups react to changes in leadership by reallocating large amounts of campaign contributions to new leadership. This result is consistent across interest-group industries and is not clustered in any particular region of the U.S.; rather, it seems to indicate the broad and far-reaching powers that legislative leaders possess.

We then explore a variety of factors that might help explain why majority-party leaders are powerful. First, major theories of partisan legislatures predict that majority parties should centralize power, i.e., that they should augment the powers of their leaders, in times of polarization. But we show that leaders if anything lose power when polarization increases—that is to say, *leaders are no more valuable, and possibly less valuable, to interest-group donors when polarization increases.*

Contrary to another set of theoretical predictions, we also find no link between the size of the majority party and the power of leaders.

Instead, we show that *leaders appear to be more powerful when their legislatures are larger* (controlling for the state’s size and for the majority’s strength), suggesting that leaders are increasingly important when issues of scale and complexity grow. This is contrast to the literature’s dominant focus on commitment problems—namely, the need for leaders to coerce legislators into supporting the party’s platform. Although we suspect such problems are also important for legislative organization, the results of our tests suggest that current theories built around these problems offer less explanatory leverage than expected. Instead, leaders seem to be most powerful when the complexity of the legislative environment is high.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we motivate our study within the theoretical literature on the power of parties and party leaders. Next, we explain our approach to measuring the power of majority-party leaders, the dataset we have collected for this purpose, and the empirical design we employ to isolate the causal effects of party leadership. Following that, we present empirical results documenting the power of majority-party leaders. In the subsequent sections, we examine how the power of majority-party leaders varies with polarization, with the size of the majority and the size of the legislature, and with the formal powers assigned to leadership. In the last empirical section we show how the results may generalize to our federal legislatures by showing how the results are consistent across levels of legislative professionalization. Finally, we discuss how the evidence helps revise our theories of the legislature.

The Power of Leaders: An Overview

Leaders are without a doubt a focal point of legislatures, yet our theories concerning their powers disagree in fundamental ways. Indeed, our reading of the literature is that the expected powers of leaders are theoretically ambiguous. Empirically, these ambiguities remain in part because it has been difficult to test our theories of leaders with data. Below, we review these theoretical ambiguities in order to motivate the empirical design that we pursue.

The Power of Leaders as Linked to Parties

The power of legislative leaders is inextricably linked to the power of parties, since leaders serve only at the whim of their parties. Our work therefore has close ties to work on legislative parties.¹

On the one hand, the strong-parties literature sees an important policy role for parties and, most importantly for our purposes, for party leaders. Though they differ in many details, the various strong-party theories agree that centralization, the act of granting enhanced powers to majority-party leaders like the Speaker of the House, is a crucial mechanism by which parties organize their power (Aldrich 1995; Aldrich and Rohde 2001; Cox and McCubbins 2005, 2007; Jenkins and Stewart 2012; Van Houweling 2007, 2012). Centralizing power allows members of the party to ensure that (a) they create a set of procedural rules such that that only a carefully considered set of policy items make it to the floor for votes, burnishing the party’s brand in the electorate (Cox and McCubbins 2007); and/or that (b) they are able to vote as a bloc on policies they care about (Aldrich and Rohde 2001).

The key problem that centralization resolves in these theories is one of collective action; many members of the majority party may be better off if the party gets more done, yet on specific votes they may prefer to deviate from the majority’s plan in order to cater to their own constituents. Without creating some sort of party structure, members may not be able to credibly commit to voting in a particular way, preventing the majority party from creating a cohesive policy platform. Ceding power to party leadership is seen, in these theories, as a way of tying members’ hands, committing them to a party platform that will make them better off, on average, even if it means occasionally voting with the party and against their constituents.

Going further, the strong-parties view also predicts that parties and their leaders should be strongest during times of polarization—times when members of the majority party share more cohesive policy preferences and when their views are further from those of the minority party. The Conditional Party Government (CPG) theory of Aldrich and Rohde (2001) is especially explicit on

¹While we focus in this paper on the role parties play in U.S. legislatures, a closely related literature studies the policy consequences of party control. Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) studies U.S. mayors and finds little evidence that Democratic and Republican mayors represent cities differently, all else equal. In the comparative context, Fiva, Folke and Sørensen (2014) offer evidence that Norwegian parties affect fiscal policy at the local level. In a similar vein, Folke (N.d.) offers evidence for the policy effects of parties in Swedish municipalities. In a British context, Fourniaies and Mutlu-Eren (2015) shows how the Prime Minister’s party allocate more resources to councils controlled by co-partisans. Finally, in the historical context, Folke, Hirano and Snyder (2011) explores how parties have used patronage as an alternate source of power.

this point, predicting that “strong party behavior is more likely if the two parties are polarized” (Aldrich and Battista 2002: 165). The logic of this prediction is straightforward. Members of the majority party must elect to cede power to their leader. If they do so, they can achieve more policy goals, but at the cost of allowing the leader to influence the form eventual policy takes. Thus, members of the majority party will be more willing to cede this power and produce a strong leader, the argument goes, when they agree more on policy and are thus less concerned with the actions the leader will take once her powers are burnished. One condition that makes members agree more on policy is polarization, which widens the gap between the views of the majority and minority parties.

On the other hand, the weak-parties literature views the preferences of legislators as driving policy irrespective of party organization. Starting from the pathbreaking work of Mayhew (1974), this literature focuses on the ways individual legislators achieve goals in the legislature. Krehbiel (1993) and Krehbiel (1998) perhaps put the weak-parties argument most forcefully, questioning the strong-party view and asking why a majority of the legislature would ever agree to any decisions—over policy or over procedure—that produce non-median policy outcomes. In the starkest spatial model of the legislature, there is simply no reason to expect the median legislator to tolerate any regime that produces policies she does not like. In particular, since even procedural votes are themselves subject to majority votes, the median legislator should never allow the creation of procedures that leave her worse off. This idea is often called “remote majoritarianism.” Because a majority must support all decisions on the basis of their underlying preferences, theories like these see no meaningful role for parties or for leaders in the policy process.

A more recent theoretical literature meets the puzzle of remote majoritarianism from its own ground, adopting the same view that legislators have simple spatial preferences but highlighting conditions under which a majority will agree to create an agenda-setting alliance that produces non-median policies (Diermeier and Vlaicu 2011; Diermeier, Prato and Vlaicu N.d.). In particular, Diermeier and Vlaicu (2011) offers not only conditions under which a majority creates an influential party voting coalition but also shows that this influence is increasing in polarization. The more correlated are the preferences of the majority, the more agenda-setting power they will be willing to create—similar to the logic of CPG. Importantly for our purposes, this power is entirely separate

from leadership. In these models, unlike in CPG, the majority’s powers do not require an individual leader to coordinate votes or otherwise organize the legislature.²

Overall, the expected powers of leaders are ambiguous. Depending on the particular modeling choices a researcher makes, majority-party leaders may be important figures at the head of a cartel that organizes the legislature to enact policies, or they may simply be figureheads in a process ruled remotely by the majority. What is more, as polarization grows, they may either obtain new powers from their increasingly allied co-partisans, or they may continue on as figureheads even as their fellow majority-party members enjoy newfound abilities to coordinate on beneficial procedures. These predictions become even more ambiguous, we suspect, if we were to consider more complicated models in which legislators have multidimensional preferences, if legislation contains both distributive and ideological components, or if legislators are able to strike side bargains concerning votes across issues. Indeed, we can speculate that complicating factors like these could predict a wide range of possibilities. In particular, if the role of the leader is to strike bargains, and if bargains are easier when preferences are more heterogeneous, then leaders might even be *less* powerful when polarization is higher, even if the majority party achieves more in times of high polarization.

Leaders as Coordinators

The ideas above all focus on what we might call conflictual problems. In these theories, legislators who disagree over specific policy goals may or may not resolve these conflicts to their mutual benefit by agreeing to an institutional structure that forces them to act in particular ways.

Coordination is a separate problem not built into these models. Even if members agree on a variety of policies they wish to achieve, it may be difficult for them to produce them in a “legislative state of nature” (Cox 2006). Separate from its potential coercive value, leadership may also be a way to bring order to chaos. When leaders set the agenda they do not necessarily skew policy (though they may well do so), but they certainly create a clear list of priorities for the legislature. In an incredibly complex world where the legislature wishes to achieve many disparate goals, coordinating the members’ efforts is clearly important (Palmer 2014). The more complex the legislature, the

²To be clear, the theory does not speak against the possible powers of leaders; it simply abstracts from the specifics of centralization and thus omits leaders.

more valuable this coordination will be. In particular, we might suspect that larger legislatures—legislatures where more members’ activities must be coordinated—thus require stronger leaders.

Consistent with this view, game theoretic and experimental studies document that larger groups face more severe coordination problems than do small groups. When playing coordination games in the laboratory, large groups “rarely coordinate on the Pareto-optimal (efficient) outcome, but small groups almost always coordinate on the efficient outcome” (Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil 1990; Weber et al. 2001: p. 582). Leaders may serve as focal points that help larger groups coordinate on pareto-efficient equilibria (Schelling 1980; Wilson and Rhodes 1997).

Using this logic, scholars of legislative organization have argued that membership size is a crucial determinant of the power of party leadership in legislatures. Cox and Magar (1999: p. 304) summarize this argument, stating that the main reason “to suspect that parties matter less in the Senate than in the House and that the majority party has a harder time getting its way in the Senate than in the House” is “chiefly the smaller number of members”.

Formalizing some of these ideas about coordination, Dewan and Myatt (2008), for one example, explores how two individual traits of leaders—their clarity and their sense of policy direction—can help a set of followers (e.g., party members) coordinate their activities successfully (see also Dewan and Myatt (2007) on leaders and coordination). While we are interested in these coordinating powers, this literature’s focus on *personal* traits is quite different from the legislative powers we are interested in studying. In particular, we would like to isolate the effects of leadership *per se*—that is, the powers of the office of leader separate from the possible powers that individuals who become leaders already possess. Although these other powers are themselves important, they are separate from the structure of legislative institutions, which is at the heart of our present inquiry. The difference-in-differences design that we lay out now in the next section directly addresses this issue and isolates the power of the leader as an institution rather than an individual.

In sum, a rich theoretical literature on the organization of democratic legislatures comes to contrasting views on the powers leaders may or may not possess, and on the conditions that can augment or detract from these powers. We take these disagreements as the departure point for our empirical study, which will seek to provide clarity on how these dynamics play out in a real-world democratic setting.

Empirical Approach

Interest-Group Campaign Contributions as a Signal of Power

Following a large body of previous work, we use interest-group campaign contributions as a revealed-preference measure of power.³ As Ansolabehere and Snyder (1998: 1674) write: “interest groups’ campaign donations should reflect the political power embedded in the differing offices sought by competing politicians.” A significant body of literature supports this notion.⁴ Indeed, there is a strong body of evidence that access-oriented interest groups allocate their contributions strategically.

First, Snyder (1992) demonstrates several ways in which interest groups, but not individuals, allocate money strategically.⁵ Cox and Magar (1999) shows how interest-group money shifts along with majority-party status, concluding that majority-party status is an important indicator of power in the legislature. Following in this spirit, Fournaies and Hall (2014) measures the “financial incumbency advantage,” i.e., the extra contributions incumbents receive purely by virtue of holding office. This large financial advantage comes largely from interest groups, who are far more sensitive to incumbency status in their contribution behavior than are individuals. Finally, Grimmer and Powell (2014) documents a similar dynamic in the U.S. House. When legislators are randomly “exiled” from important committees, interest groups, especially those whose economic interests align with the policy jurisdiction of the committees in question, dramatically scale back their donations.

If we think of interest groups as optimizing their investments in politicians subject to a budget constraint (e.g., Denzau and Munger 1986; Grier and Munger 1991; Grier, Munger and Roberts 1994), then the amount of money they give to leaders is not only an indicator of power in a broad sense, but a cardinal measure of *how* powerful they are; the more money they get from strategic interest-group donors, the more powerful they should be, generally. What is more, because our

³Many studies have sought to investigate the power of state legislative officers for a variety of purposes (for a recent review, see Battista (2011)). Some papers study *de jure* power, investigating variation across states in the formal delineation of leadership powers (e.g., Mooney 2013; Richman 2010). The second approach involves asking legislators who they think is powerful (e.g., Clucas 2007). Both have proven fruitful, but neither directly concern the policy-specific power of leaders that we are interested in studying in this paper.

⁴For theoretical papers supporting this idea, too, see: Hall and Wayman (1990) and Kroszner and Stratmann (1998).

⁵In particular, these groups are shown to prefer younger candidates, all else equal, because of the higher future value of their expected influence. In addition, groups are shown to donate to senators in equal amounts regardless of state size, reflecting their equal power in the legislature.

empirical design examines individuals who *switch* into and out of leadership, it removes the fixed characteristics of individuals and isolates the power of the leadership position, itself. As a result, our approach seeks to measure the relative magnitudes of the power of the office of leader across a variety of contexts.

Naturally, there are many kinds—and many “faces”—of power (Bachrach and Baratz 1962). We cannot observe many of these types of power, and we do not wish to present the overall concept of power as something simple to measure, or something that can be easily reduced to dollar amounts. To gain empirical traction we must inevitably make sacrifices. Although like previous literature we are forced to focus on a relatively narrow sense of power—only that which interest groups are sensitive to—we gain the ability to study this power across a wide variety of institutional contexts.

New Dataset on State Legislative Leadership Positions

To study leaders, we manually collected a dataset on the identities of all Speakers, Presidents, majority and minority party leaders, whips and various other leadership positions in both parties across all 99 state legislative chambers during the period 1990-2012, using primary sources. Primary information on these positions comes from volumes of the quarterly-published *State Yellow Book* from 1990-2014 (Leadership Directories 2014). Our secondary sources are the publicly available legislative minutes and proceedings from various state legislatures. To ensure the transparency and reproducibility of our work, Tables A.6, A.7, A.8, A.9, A.10, and A.11 in the Appendix provide the entirety of our majority-party leadership dataset. The tables offer a complete list of all the majority-party leaders in our sample along with information on when they served as members and leaders of their respective legislatures. In Figure A.1 in the Appendix, we also graphically illustrate the average number of leadership positions across states in a given year.

The organization of state legislatures differs in many ways across states and chambers,⁶ and so do leadership designations. For example, some states do not use the term “majority leader” but refer to the “Democratic Leader” or “Republican Leader,” and in other states the same position is referred to as the “leader of the floor majority.” Similarly, some states use the same designation to refer to very different positions. For example, the “President of the Senate” is essentially an empty title

⁶One important way in which state legislatures vary concerns term limits. A fair number of U.S. states only allow representatives to serve for a small number of terms. We might expect that leaders are much less powerful in such settings, and indeed, we show that this is the case in the Appendix.

given to the Lieutenant Governor in some states, whereas it is a powerful member appointed by the majority of the Senate in others. To ensure that leaders are comparable across states, we carefully construct four variables referring to leader positions that are procedurally similar across state legislatures (Speaker of the House, President Pro Tempore of the Senate, Majority and Minority Leader of the Senate and House, respectively). Based on the full name, party affiliation, legislative district and year, we manually matched the leadership information to the unique legislator identifier in the most commonly used dataset on state legislative elections (Klarner et al. 2013). This allows us—and future researchers—to merge accurate information on party leaders and electoral outcomes for all state legislatures.

Finally, we also merged in data on campaign contributions from the National Institute On Money In State Politics. This dataset provides information on total campaign receipts by candidate, 1990–2012. It also breaks the contributions down by the economic sector of the contributor, based on state-level disclosure requirements. In addition, we are able to separate contributions made by individuals from those made directly by groups based on formatting regularities in the dataset. Finally, because the dataset distinguishes contributions to candidates from those made to leadership PACs or party committees, we can isolate contributions flowing to the candidate him or herself.

Isolating the Effect of Leadership: A Difference-in-Differences Design

We consider a legislator a member of the majority-party leadership if she is either Speaker of the House/Assembly, President Pro Tempore of the Senate or Majority Leader or Majority Floor Leader (in cases with no Majority Leader) in either the House or Senate.⁷ Based on this information, we construct the main treatment variable:

$$Leader_{it} = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if inc. in district } i \text{ is a member of the Majority Leadership at time } t \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

The key identification problem is that leaders are not randomly selected. If we simply make an on-average comparison of individuals who are and are not leaders, we may find that the leaders receive far more contributions simply because those who are likely to ascend to leadership are

⁷To be clear, in any case where there is a “Majority Leader” we use this title. In cases where there is no Majority Leader we next look for a “Majority Floor Leader.” To ensure that our results are not driven by the exact choice of offices, we replicate results in the Appendix using a variety of stricter or looser definitions of “leadership.”

already especially effective, popular legislators. Instead of comparing across legislators, we therefore make comparisons *within* legislators over time, washing out all time in-variant characteristics of legislators, such as their overall quality, popularity, and ability to raise funds. To put it differently, we identify the causal effect of leadership by comparing within-legislator changes in contributions as legislators move in and out of the leadership treatment to within-legislator changes in incumbents who do not attain a leadership position.⁸

More formally, we implement the idea illustrated in the map above in a panel difference-in-difference setup in which we estimate equations of the form

$$\text{Log Money}_{i,t+1} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Leader}_{it} + \alpha_i + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{i,t+1}, \quad (2)$$

where $\text{Log Money}_{i,t+1}$ measures the log of total contributions to incumbent i at time $t+1$;⁹ Leader_{it} is the variable defined in equation 1; α_i represents legislator fixed effects; δ_t represents year fixed effects; and, finally, $\varepsilon_{i,t+1}$ is the error term.

With the inclusion of both legislator and year fixed effects, the analysis is a difference-in-differences design in which changes in campaign receipts for legislators who become leaders (or stop being leaders) are compared to changes over the same time period among “control” legislators who are not majority-party leaders.¹⁰ This isolates the causal effect of leadership under the assumption that the control legislators are a good counterfactual prediction for how contributions to a “treated” legislator would have changed had the representative not become a leader at time t .¹¹

⁸This setup averages over several ways in which individuals can stop and start being majority-party leaders. One way is for their party to become the majority when they are already the minority-party leader. Another way is for them to rise to the rank of leader while their party is already the majority. In the Appendix, we investigate possible variation in the effect across these different treatment paths. We find that both have very large effects.

⁹We use $\log(\text{total contributions} + 1)$ to deal with unusual cases in which an incumbent does not receive any contributions. The results are not depend on whether we use 1, 10, 100 or exclude the observations.

¹⁰An undesirable but necessary feature of the design is that it selects on the decision of majority-party leaders to run for reelection. Without this selection, there is no observed value for the outcome variable under treatment (i.e., how much money does the majority-party leader raise if she does not run?). An alternative possibility is to conduct the analysis at the district level, coding the treatment to reflect whether the district’s representative is the majority-party leader or not, and coding the outcome variable as the amount of money flowing to the majority-party leader’s party in the district regardless of whether or not she chooses to run again. The downside to this alternative, of course, is that the definition of the treatment is confusing and interpreting the effect is not straightforward. Nevertheless, we have carried out this district-level analysis and have found that the results are highly similar to the individual fixed-effects specification.

¹¹This assumption is much more plausible than assuming, for example, that majority-party leaders are just like other representatives, as would be assumed in a typical “naive” comparison across districts. It is also weaker than the assumption employed in a simple legislator fixed-effects framework, which makes within-legislator comparisons without adjusting for unobserved changes over time.

This “parallel trends” assumption is relatively plausible in our case, since becoming leader depends on many factors outside the individual legislator’s control. The most common reason for a representative to become leader is a switch in majority-party status in the legislature, well beyond the control of an individual representative. Another common reason is the retirement of a previous majority-party leader, also a decision “exogenous” in many ways from incumbent herself. While it is obvious that legislators who become leaders are likely to be senior—since we might suspect leaders to be drawn from among the most senior of legislators—the difference-in-differences design accounts for this directly by making *within*-legislator comparisons.

In addition to these reasons to believe in the design’s validity, we also validate it empirically in several ways in the Appendix. First, we include leads and lags of the treatment variable, and show that the findings are robust to these inclusions. We also re-implement the analysis using state-year fixed effects instead of simple year fixed effects. Finally, we also consider a variety of more flexible control groups, including only candidates in the same state, in the same party, and with the same level of seniority.¹² In all cases, estimates remain highly stable, suggesting that the design is valid.

Finally, the baseline specification above uses all legislators in all chambers who do not become leaders as the “control” group with which to construct the counterfactual trend for legislators who become leaders. This may be an overly broad control group. In the Appendix, we present results using state-by-year fixed effects, so that only legislators within a given state are used as controls, and we also present results with state-seniority-year fixed effects or state-chamber-party-year fixed effects, so that only legislators in the same state with the same level of seniority, or in the same party, are used as controls. We continue to find the same pattern of results.


Results: Legislative Leaders Are Powerful

Main Results

Before presenting formal results, we first investigate the effect of majority-party leadership graphically. Figure 1 presents average total interest-group contributions over time to two sets of incumbents: those that become majority-party leader, and those that never do. In the spirit of the

¹²In a typical difference-in-differences, we would also run a robustness check where we include unit-specific time trends to relax the parallel trends assumption. Unfortunately, due to the very large number of legislators in our dataset, we have been unable to estimate this specification even on a large-scale computing cluster.

Figure 1 – The Effect of Majority-Party Leadership on Interest-Group Campaign Contributions. The figure compares trends over time in interest group contributions to incumbents who become majority-party leader vs. incumbents who never become leader. Leaders see a large increase in interest-group contributions that non-leaders do not. Since interest-group donors are known to seek out those with power, the increase implies that the majority-party leadership position conveys power to those who hold it.



difference-in-differences design, we rescale each observation’s year to indicate how many years are remaining (or have passed) until the incumbent in question becomes leader, and we construct the control group using the set of incumbents who never become leader but who serve over the same time period as each “treated” incumbent.

The results clearly suggest a large effect of majority-party leadership on interest-group contributions. Before treatment, future leaders appear to garner more contributions than non-leaders, as we might expect, but the trends of the two groups look similar—the assumption necessary for the difference-in-differences. After the “treated” group become leaders, however, we see a large jump up in interest-group contributions—and we see no such change in the control group over the same time period. This effect persists for many years after treatment.

The graph suggests that “treated” incumbents have similar pre-treatment trends to control incumbents, although there appears to be a noticeable bump up in soon-to-be leaders’ contributions one term before they become leaders. This is a potential violation of the diff-in-diff assumption of parallel trends, although the large and discontinuous jump in contributions immediately after

treatment suggests the presence of a meaningful effect. In the Appendix, we present a battery of evidence to suggest that the possibility of a differential slope does not drive the positive effects that we find in our analysis. The pre-treatment bump for treated individuals likely indicates, at least in part, anticipatory behavior on the part of strategic donors. Many majority-party leaders are “next in line” for quite some time before becoming leader, giving groups ample time to foster a relationship via contributions in advance of the official change in leadership status. This anticipatory behavior will in fact bias us *against* finding a positive effect. In this respect our estimates may actually be closer to a lower bound on the effect of leadership.

Turning now to formal estimates, Table 1 presents OLS estimates of the difference-in-differences design from equation 2 using three outcome variables: the log of total contributions from interest-group donors, the log of total contributions from all sources, and the log of total contributions from individual donors. In all three columns, we see evidence for the significant power that legislative leaders possess.

Consider the results in the first column. Here we see that becoming the majority-party leader is estimated to cause a 0.47 log-point increase in total contributions from interest groups, on average across all states and chambers. This corresponds to roughly a 60% increase in contributions ($\exp(0.47) - 1 \approx 0.60$). Overall, leadership conveys a massive increase in campaign donations.¹³ This estimate captures the policy power of majority-party leaders. Becoming the majority-party leader triggers a huge burst of contributions by donors that we know from other work are highly strategic. The results thus show that leaders, on average, possess considerable power in state legislatures.

In the final two columns, we look at the effects on total contributions from all sources, and total contributions from individual donors.¹⁴ As the second column shows, leadership causes a large on-average increase in contributions from all sources. Comparing the first and third columns, we see that party leadership causes equally large increases in both individual and group donations. The increase in individual contributions suggests the symbolic power of leaders. Individuals, unlike

¹³We find the same result using levels instead of the log of contributions. Become the majority-party leader is estimated to cause an increase of roughly \$47,000 in contributions from interest groups ($t = 3.23$; robust standard errors clustered by state).

¹⁴Note that total contributions is the sum of group contributions, individual contributions and unclassified contributions. Hence, the coefficient on total contributions (or log thereof) is not a simple weighted average of the coefficients on individual and group donations.

Table 1 – Effect of Attaining Party Leadership on Campaign Contributions. Leadership causes a large increase in contributions, including from strategic interest-group donors whose behavior reveals the power of party leaders.

	Log Group Contributions (\$)	Log Total Contributions (\$)	Log Individual Contributions (\$)
Majority-Party Leader	0.47 (0.06)	0.46 (0.06)	0.55 (0.09)
N	36,875	36,875	36,875
Individual Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses.


interest groups, are consumption-oriented in their donation behavior (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo and Snyder 2003). The increase in contributions that candidates receive for being the majority-party leader thus likely indicates the increased ideological utility that individuals receive for supporting the leader, the public face of the party.

Ruling Out Fundraising Effort as Main Mechanism

Our main analysis is motivated by the idea that interest-group contributions indicate legislative power. But what if, instead, or in addition, individual legislators who become leaders exert more fundraising effort as part of their new job? At the federal level, for example, new Speakers of the House are expected to raise tremendous funds for their party, and to reallocate these funds to co-partisans strategically (e.g., Jenkins and Monroe 2012). Although to some extent these funds still indicate the power of leaders, they may be driven more by the effort of legislators than by the desires of interest groups.

We think this sort of effort is unlikely to drive our results for two important reasons. First, we exclude from the dataset contributions made to leadership PACs and party committees. To the extent leaders' fundraising efforts focus on these channels, our results will not be contaminated. Second, we also investigate the timing of the effects of attaining leadership on campaign contributions. Specifically, in the Appendix, we estimate the effect of leadership on interest-group contributions just in the two months after the election, before the next legislative session. We find a large *immediate* effect on interest-group contributions for leaders. Even before they assume their

Figure 2 – Geographical Variation in the Value of Leaders. The map reports the estimated campaign finance value of party leader positions across state legislatures. Darker colors indicate more valuable leadership positions.



Note: The map illustrates the point estimates of the state-specific value of leadership obtained by estimating Equation 3 with state-year fixed effects using OLS. NE is excluded because of the non-partisan, unicameral system.

position—and perhaps begin fulfilling their new fundraising duties—interest groups already seek out leaders.

Effects by State

How does the value of party leadership vary across states? To answer this question, we interact the leadership indicator with state dummy variables, and using OLS we estimate the state-specific value of party leaders based on Equation 3. Specifically, we estimate

$$\text{Log Money}_{i,t+1} = \beta_0 + \sum_{\omega \in \Omega} \beta_{\omega} \text{Leader}_{it} + \alpha_i + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{i,t+1}, \quad (3)$$

where Ω is the set containing the 49 states in our sample,¹⁵ and all other variables are the same as previously described. The coefficient β_{ω} represents the average value of party leadership in state ω . We plot the point estimates of these parameters onto the map in Figure 2.

¹⁵Nebraska is not in our sample because it has a non-partisan unicameral legislature. In practice, we also end up omitting Louisiana and West Virginia for this analysis because of limited turnover in the identity of the leader in these states.

The map suggests that there is substantial geographical variation in the value of party leaders. Interest groups are most sensitive to leadership positions in the state legislatures in Mississippi, Rhode Island, Texas, Pennsylvania and Utah. On average, a leadership position in those states engenders more than a one log-point increase in campaign contributions, or more than a 100% increase. Conversely, at the lower end of the spectrum in the legislatures in Maryland, Arkansas, Montana and Maine, we find that interest groups value leaders no more than they value rank-and-file legislators.

More broadly, the map shows that donors who value leadership positions are not geographically concentrated in a few clusters of states, but appear to be spread throughout the country. Some of the states in which interest groups appear to value party leaders the most are bordered by states in which leadership is valued least. This suggests that factors such as regional industrial composition or regional labor markets do not drive the variation in interest-group behavior, but rather that interest groups are reacting to state-specific circumstances.

No Link Between Polarization and Leadership Power

A major goal of the theoretical literature on parties is to explain when and why they ought to be powerful and when and why they ought to be weak. As we reviewed earlier, one main prediction in the literature on U.S. legislatures is that parties should centralize power in times of high polarization.


Measuring Polarization

To assess how the power of leaders varies with polarization, we require a measure of polarization. Though we could use a measure based on roll-call voting in state legislatures (Shor and McCarty 2011)—and indeed, we pursue this strategy in the Appendix—we worry that this measure is *post-treatment* for our analysis. If leaders are powerful, and the evidence in the previous section shows that they are, then they can affect what bills are voted on, and thus influence estimated ideal points of legislators. As a result we cannot then examine how the effect of attaining leadership varies with this measure of polarization, since it is not a pre-treatment covariate.

To circumvent this problem, we instead use a measure of ideology based on campaign contributions (Bonica 2013, 2014). This measure does not depend on the agenda in the legislature, and is in fact entirely external to the legislature, thus avoiding the post-treatment problem described above. In addition, by using this measure we can avoid selecting on winning election, too, since the measure exists for both winning and losing candidates (as long as they raise sufficient funds during the election). Accordingly, we measure polarization as the difference in the median ideological position of each party’s entire candidate pool in a given state and year.¹⁶

Polarization and the Power of Majority-Party Leaders

Figure 3 – The Majority-Party Leader’s Edge in Interest-Group Contributions Across Levels of Polarization. The figure plots the difference in logged interest-group contributions flowing to the majority-party leader vs. non-leaders, across levels of polarization.



Note: Grey points are state-year averages; interest-group contributions are residualized by state and year. Black line is loess fit with span of 1.4; shaded area represents 95% confidence interval.

First, we examine graphical evidence. The left panel of Figure 3 plots the logged difference between average interest-group contributions to leaders and non-leaders across levels of polarization for each state-chamber year observation in the dataset. The relationship between polarization and

¹⁶Undeniably it is conceptually awkward to use campaign contributions as our outcome variable as well as using them to measure polarization. However, our main outcome of interest is only interest-group contributions, while the scalings in large part reflect the preferences of individual donors (who contribute the largest share of all money and are especially ideological (Barber N.d.)). For more on this issue, see Bonica (2013, 2014).

the leadership premium seems to be relatively flat; there is some evidence for a downward slope, but it is difficult to draw a strong conclusion. Nevertheless, it is clear that there is no *upward* relationship; polarization does not appear to predict an increase in the degree to which interest groups seek out majority-party leaders with their contributions.

It is possible that the relationship is obscured by our use of levels of contributions. Perhaps more polarized legislatures just have fewer donations overall. The gap between leaders and non-leaders might therefore fall simply because there is less money in total. To address this possibility, the right panel of the figure performs the same comparison but using the *share* of interest-group contributions in the entire legislature that go to the leader. Here, things are noisier. Again, though, we see a flat and possibly negative, but certainly not positive, relationship.

To test this more formally, we first estimate equations of the form

$$\text{Log Money}_{i,t+1} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Leader}_{it} + \beta_2 \text{Polarization}_{it} \times \text{Leader}_{it} + \beta_3 \text{Polarization}_{it} + \alpha_i + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{i,t+1}, \quad (4)$$

where Polarization_{it} is the contribution-based estimate of polarization at time t for the state in which district i is located. Since polarization is at the state level, the α_i now represent state, rather than legislator, fixed effects. The analysis thus compares the difference in average contributions to leaders and non-leaders, within states, in times when polarization in the state increases relative to its own mean and relative to trends in other states over the same time period. Clearly, polarization is not “randomly” assigned. However, by investigating within-state changes in polarization—and how these changes interact with the differential campaign receipts of leaders—and benchmarking these changes to changes in other states, we are able to obtain what we think is plausibly exogenous variation in polarization.

The quantity of interest is again β_2 , which now measures the differential effect of leadership across levels of polarization. To aid in interpretation, we standardize the polarization measure to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1. The coefficient β_2 thus captures the difference in the effect of attaining leadership for a one standard-deviation increase in polarization. Table 2 presents the estimated results. The first row captures the effect of leadership on campaign contributions in a legislature with average polarization (since the polarization measure is standardized to have mean 0). Echoing Table 1, we see large effects of leadership in these legislatures. The second row

Table 2 – Effect of Attaining Majority-Party Leadership on Campaign Contributions Across Levels of Polarization. The negative and statistically insignificant coefficients on the interaction terms suggest that majority leaders are *not* more powerful in polarized legislatures.

	Log Group Contributions (\$)	Log Total Contributions (\$)	Log Individual Contributions (\$)
Majority-Party Leader	0.45 (0.06)	0.45 (0.06)	0.56 (0.09)
Leader \times Polarization	-0.13 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.07)	0.00 (0.10)
Polarization	-0.29 (0.15)	-0.44 (0.17)	-0.32 (0.15)
Intercept	8.68 (0.02)	10.08 (0.02)	8.37 (0.02)
N	35,044	35,044	35,044
Individual Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. Polarization standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1.

presents our new quantity of interest. As we see, the interaction term is consistently negative but noisy. When polarization is one standard deviation higher than average, the effect of leadership is considerably smaller (0.42 vs. 0.52 for interest-group contributions, as shown in the first column). However, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no difference. That being said, the table is strong evidence *against* the hypothesis that there is a positive link between polarization and the power of majority-party leaders.

As in the figures, we next re-estimate these results using the share of contributions in the legislature that go to the leader, to address the possibility that the change in the gap is driven by a change in the overall level of contributions (indeed, we see in Table 2 that there is a negative coefficient on the main effect for Polarization). Specifically, we now estimate equations of the form

$$Leader\ Pct_{i,t+1} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Polarization_{it} + \alpha_i + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{i,t+1}, \quad (5)$$

where $Leader\ Pct_{i,t+1}$ captures the percentage (running from 0 to 100) of all contributions in the legislature at time $t + 1$ that go to the majority-party leader. The quantity of interest is now β_1 , the coefficient on $Polarization_{it}$.

Table 3 – Effect of Polarization on Share of Money Going to Majority-Party Leader. Polarization has a statistically insignificant and substantively negligible effect on the share of donations flowing to majority party leaders.

	Pct of Group \$ (0–100)	Pct of Total \$ (0–100)	Pct of Individual \$ (0–100)
Polarization	-0.97 (1.49)	-1.21 (1.35)	-0.41 (2.34)
N	767	767	767
State-Chamber Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. Polarization standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1.

As Table 3 shows, we find an extremely negligible link. In the first column, a one standard-deviation increase in polarization is estimated to cause a 0.97 percentage-point *decrease* in the share of all money flowing to the leader. This is a small effect, and we cannot reject the null that there is no effect.¹⁷

In addition to the ideological distance between the parties, some theories—most notably, CPG—also predict that leaders should be more powerful when the cohesion of the majority party, the “intraparty homogeneity,” is higher. In the Appendix, we test for this, measuring homogeneity using the standard deviation of estimated ideology for majority-party members. We again find no link. If anything, more heterogeneous parties appear to have more powerful leaders, but the estimated interaction coefficient is small and we cannot reject the null of no difference.

Taken together, we find mixed evidence for polarization’s effect on the power of majority-party leaders, but we find strong evidence that this effect is *not* positive. If anything, polarization appears to reduce the power of the majority-party leader, but it is perhaps most likely that it simply has no bearing—in contrast to many theoretical predictions. We will discuss what these results imply for our legislative theories at the end of the paper, after we consider a variety of other predictions and sources of leadership power.

¹⁷In the Appendix, we replicate these specifications using NP scores (based on roll-call votes) to measure polarization. Again we find a negative intercept in the interactive model. However, in the specification where the share of money flowing to the leader is the outcome, we do find a positive and significant effect. However, this effect is still substantively small; a two standard-deviation increase in NP-score polarization is still estimated to lead to only a 6 percentage-point increase in the share of money to the leader. For the other reasons we have discussed, namely post-treatment bias, we do not prefer this alternate specification, but we report it nonetheless in order to be comprehensive.

Larger Legislatures, More Powerful Leaders

So far, we have seen the leaders wield considerable power but that this power does not appear linked to the level of legislative polarization. Why else might leaders be powerful? In the theoretical section, we discussed an alternative view in which leaders are important because they coordinate members' efforts in highly complex environments. One prediction associated with this view is that leaders should be more important in larger legislatures, where the need to reduce complexity and to coordinate activities is greater.

Separately, the size of the majority party may matter for conflictual theories of the legislature. In particular, leaders may become more powerful when the size of their majority grows—holding the size of the legislature constant (Patty 2008). We can investigate both of these hypotheses using our data. The state legislatures vary considerably in both the size of the legislature and in the size of the majority party. What is more, states have changed the sizes of their legislatures with some frequency over time, so we can examine both across and within-state variation in size.

Figure 4 shows overall patterns in the power of party leaders and the size of legislatures, previewing our formal estimates. We plot the state-level estimates obtained from Equation 3 against the size of the legislatures, averaging across chambers within each state.¹⁸ A strong positive association is seen; the effect of becoming a leader on log total interest-group contributions is much larger—approximately 1.5 log points larger—in the largest legislature vs. the smallest. According to the patterns in interest group donations, party leaders are more powerful in larger legislatures.


Next, we explore these relationships by estimating Equations of the form

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Log Money}_{i,t+1} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Leader}_{it} + \beta_2 \text{Leader}_{it} \times \text{Size}_{it} + \\ & \beta_3 \text{Size}_{it} + \alpha_i + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{i,t+1}, \end{aligned} \tag{6}$$

where Size_{it} measures either the seats in the legislature or the size of the majority party relative to the minority party; all other variables are the same as described in the previous equations.

¹⁸When we disaggregate by chamber, effects appear to be significantly larger for lower chambers vs. upper chambers. This may be because there is simply not very much variation in legislature size among upper chambers, which all tend to be small.

Figure 4 – Power of Leadership Grows with Size of Legislature. Plots the average size of the legislature in terms of total number of members against the estimated effect of leadership on log total interest-group campaign contributions. There is a strong positive link between how big the legislature is and how powerful leaders are.



Note: For presentational purposes, NH is omitted from graph because it is a massive positive outlier. However, it is included in all reported regression results, and its inclusion in the figure does not remove the clear positive slope of the fitted line.

We present the results from this analysis in Table 4, and in Tables A.13 and A.14 in the Appendix we show that the results neither depend on the size of state populations nor the specific way that we measure majority size. The coefficient on the interaction between the legislature size and the leadership indicator is positive, statistically significant and substantial in magnitude. On average, a one log point increase in size boosts the value of leadership positions by approximately 0.2 log points.

Conversely, in Table 5, we show that the coefficients on leadership variables' interaction with the majority size are not statistically significant, nor substantial in magnitude: The coefficients on the interaction terms are very precisely estimated zeros. The results lend support to the idea that the power of party leaders—as measured by the price interest groups' willing to pay for access—depend on the size of legislatures, but not necessarily the size of the majority party.

Table 4 – Effect of Attaining Majority-Party Leadership on Campaign Contributions Across Membership and Majority Sizes of Legislatures. Majority-party leaders are more powerful in large legislatures.

	Log Group Contributions (\$)	Log Total Contributions (\$)	Log Individual Contributions (\$)
Leader \times Log(Total Seats)	0.20 (0.09)	0.15 (0.09)	0.13 (0.13)
Log(Total Seats)	-0.52 (0.22)	-0.84 (0.11)	-0.79 (0.12)
Majority-Party Leader	-0.38 (0.39)	-0.18 (0.37)	-0.01 (0.53)
Intercept	11.26 (0.99)	14.10 (0.50)	12.09 (0.54)
N	36,875	36,875	36,875
Individual Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses.

Linking De Facto and De Jure Power

Institutional rules may influence the ability of legislative leaders to set the political agenda. We have been careful not to use these “on-the-books” rules as our measure of actual power because they may not reflect what leaders can actually accomplish. This is true in both directions. A leader may appear potent based on the particular authorities the legislature grants to her, but may actually be unable to wield these powers due to unseen mechanisms inside the legislature. Or, a leader may appear to possess few specific powers in the legislature, while in reality being in charge of a great many activities. More generally, since the rules of procedure—including the rules governing the authorities leadership does or does not possess—are chosen by the members of the legislature, they are not a reliable indicator of where power actually lies. Nevertheless, to the extent that rules are longstanding and may be too sticky to change in the short run, we may observe interesting patterns in how the presence of different procedural rules corresponds to the actions of interest-group campaign contributors. We have good reason to think such stickiness exists. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that the majority party frequently deploys, for example, negative agenda power to block policies the majority of its members do not like (e.g., Gailmard and Jenkins 2007; Jenkins and Monroe 2014). Below, we follow this strategy, though we wish to emphasize that such results are only speculative.

Table 5 – Effect of Attaining Majority-Party Leadership on Campaign Contributions Across Membership and Majority Sizes of Legislatures. The power of majority leaders does *not* depend on the size of the majority party relative to the minority party

	Log Group Contributions (\$)	Log Total Contributions (\$)	Log Individual Contributions (\$)
Leader × Majority (%)	0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	0.000 (0.005)
Majority Majority (%)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)
Majority-Party Leader	0.451 (0.099)	0.432 (0.094)	0.545 (0.135)
Intercept	9.110 (0.084)	10.309 (0.075)	8.547 (0.076)
N	36,818	36,818	36,818
Individual Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes


Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses.

In particular, we explore three links between the de facto power of political leaders—as measured by interest group donation patterns—and the de jure authority of these leaders as defined by formal institutional rules governing the following issues: (1) control over the process of bill referrals, (2) appointment of committee members, and (3) the ability to schedule the legislative agenda. For each legislative chamber, we define dummy variables indicating whether institutional rules allow the majority party leaders to control a given aspect of the legislative process. These institutional variables are interacted with the leadership indicator, and we estimate the following equation using OLS:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Log Money}_{i,t+1} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Leader}_{it} + \beta_2 \text{Leader}_{it} \times \text{Refer}_{it} + \\
 & \beta_3 \text{Leader}_{it} \times \text{Appoint}_{it} + \beta_4 \text{Leader}_{it} \times \text{Agenda}_{it} \\
 & + \beta_5 \text{Refer}_{it} + \beta_6 \text{Appoint}_{it} + \beta_7 \text{Agenda}_{it} \\
 & + \alpha_i + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{i,t+1}.
 \end{aligned} \tag{7}$$

Table A.15 presents the formal results from this analysis. Figure 5 presents the resulting quantities of interest. Neither the power to set the legislative agenda or the power to appoint

Figure 5 – De Facto Power and De Jure Rules. Leaders seem to be especially powerful when they have the authority to refer bills to committees. The powers to appoint committee members and to set the legislative agenda do not appear to be associated with any change in the power of leaders.




committee members seems associated with more powerful leadership; however, the ability to refer bills to committees does. The substantive difference in the effects is large; when leaders control bill referrals, interest groups value them roughly 0.4 log points, or roughly 50% more, than when they cannot refer bills.

Effects Constant Across Levels of Legislative Professionalization

To study the power of majority-party leaders, and to study how this power varies across institutional contexts, we need changes in the identities of leaders and in the contexts in which they serve. State legislatures are the natural context into which to conduct such a study. The theories that animate the research, though, are often focused on our federal legislatures and especially on the U.S. House. How well do results about state legislatures speak to the federal context?

Although it is of course difficult to verify precisely how externally valid our results are, one thing we can do is to examine whether our effects are consistent when we look only at the most professionalized legislatures. These legislatures share many common features with the U.S. House; legislators are well compensated in these state legislatures, they work full time, and they have

Figure 6 – The Power of State Legislative Leaders Across Levels of Legislative Professionalization. More professionalized state legislatures do not appear to have more powerful legislative leaders.



dedicated staffs, among other things (Squire 1992, 2007, 2012). If we continue to find the same pattern of results in these types of legislatures, we may be more confident that our results can apply to the federal context as well.

Figure 6 presents a first look at whether the effects of leadership status seems to vary across levels of professionalization. Specifically, the plot reflects the average level of professionalization for each state and the average effect of leadership on interest-group campaign contributions in that state, over the entire time period. Because the Squire measure relates to all legislative chambers within each state, these results are aggregated across upper and lower chambers for each state. As the figure shows, we find little difference in the estimated power of leaders across professionalization; whether we consider the most professionalized legislatures (e.g., California), or the least (e.g., New Hampshire), we find a consistent, large effect. This suggests that the power of leaders does not depend on how professionalized the legislature is, which in turn suggests that the results should speak somewhat directly to our federal legislatures, too, even though these are highly professionalized chambers.

Table 6 – Effect of Attaining Party Leadership on Campaign Contributions, Ten Most Professionalized State Legislatures. The finding that leadership positions are valuable are robust when the sample is limited to the most professionalized state legislatures, suggesting that the conclusions may extend to the federal legislatures as well.

	Log Group Contributions (\$)	Log Total Contributions (\$)	Log Individual Contributions (\$)
Majority-Party Leader	0.28 (0.14)	0.20 (0.14)	0.12 (0.18)
N	6,721	6,721	6,721
Individual Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses.

More formally, we re-estimate our main equation focusing only on the ten state legislatures ranked as most professionalized in the most up-to-date version of the Squire index (Squire 2012). Table 6 presents the results. In column 1, we see that we continue to find a very large effect of becoming the majority-party leader on contributions from interest groups. It is interesting to note that the effect on individual contributions is somewhat diminished, possibly suggesting that in these more professionalized legislatures leaders carry less ideological weight than in other legislatures. Nevertheless, the main result persists and is almost as strong as before. Even in the state legislatures that are most like the U.S. House, the majority-party leader wields significant power.

Next, we re-estimate the effects of polarization on the share of contributions flowing to the majority-party leader. Table 7 presents the results. Here, the effects of polarization are markedly *more* negative than before (although we still cannot reject the null that there is no relationship). Even when looking at only the most professionalized legislatures, we continue to find no positive link—and possibly a negative one—between polarization and the power of the majority-party leader.

Conclusion

How much influence do majority-party leaders have on the legislative process? This question has animated much of the scholarly discussion on Congress, legislative politics, and elections over the past century. Despite a rich and varied theoretical literature, there is little empirical evidence

Table 7 – Effect of Polarization on Share of Money Going to Majority-Party Leader, Ten Most Professionalized State Legislatures. The finding that leaders are *not* more powerful when legislatures are polarized still holds when the sample is limited to the most professionalized state legislatures, suggesting that similar conclusions may apply to the federal level.

	Pct of Group \$ (0–100)	Pct of Total \$ (0–100)	Pct of Individual \$ (0–100)
Polarization	-0.31 (1.42)	-2.02 (1.51)	-1.64 (4.54)
N	146	146	146
State-Chamber Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. Polarization standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1.

available for this debate. This gap in the empirical literature is the result, in our view, of two major obstacles.

First, defining and measuring legislative power is difficult. To overcome this difficulty, we have applied a longstanding technique from elsewhere in the American Politics literature, using interest-group campaign contributions to track power. This approach is justified by the clear evidence that access-oriented groups seek out those in the legislature who can accomplish the political goals they desire. By circumventing the issues of the approaches mentioned above, our indirect measure of power reflects when and where the majority party and its leaders can exert their influence to “get things done,” and where they are not able to do so. This measure is neither exhaustive, since it surely misses a variety of other ways in which leaders are powerful, nor perfect, but it appears to be a solid indicator of broad trends in leadership power.

Second, we need variation in the institutional context in which leaders serve. This is simply not possible at the federal level, where there are only two cases (the House and Senate) to study. We overcome this issue by collecting a new dataset on leadership positions in state legislatures. This dataset, which we hope will prove fruitful for researchers studying political parties and their leaders, has allowed us to obtain plausibly exogenous variation in the identities of majority-party leaders. Using a difference-in-differences design to address concerns of candidate quality and other unobserved characteristics that lead some members of the legislature to become party leaders and others not to, we are able to isolate the effect of majority-party leadership on campaign contributions from interest groups.

Overall, we find that strategic interest groups allocate a large amount of funds based purely on leadership status. When a representative becomes the majority-party leader in a state legislature, her campaign receipts from interest groups increase sharply. These groups have every incentive to seek out those with power. The fact that majority-party leadership status causes them to contribute so much more money therefore suggests the overall power of majority-party leaders. Importantly, this power does not flow from the personal characteristics of those in leadership positions, which our research design accounts for; instead, we measure only the power that flows directly from the position, itself. And since the position's powers are largely partisan, the paper therefore suggests, though cannot directly measure, the power of parties themselves as well.

By investigating the specific sources of the effect of party leadership on campaign contributions, we also contribute to the literature on *how* majority-party leaders are powerful. We find that leaders play a dual role in the legislature. They provide consistent value to access groups, which indicates that they have some kind of power to offer accomplishments that these groups find valuable, but they also gain significant contributions from ideological groups and individuals. This suggests that leaders have the power to produce both ideological and non-ideological goods. They are both the principal actor in producing policy and the symbolic head of their party.

We also apply our empirical design to measure how the power of leaders and their parties differs across institutional contexts, thereby shedding light on *why* they are powerful. Contrary to some of the dominant theories of U.S. legislatures, we find no link between the polarization of the legislature and the power that flows to the majority-party leader. Indeed, if anything our tests suggest that polarization *reduces* the power of the leader, especially in professionalized legislatures. In a similar vein, we find no link between the size of the majority party's coalition and the power of its leaders.

On the other hand, we do find evidence that leaders are more powerful in larger legislatures—that is, in legislatures with a larger number of legislators. We have argued that this pattern is consistent with the view that leaders provide value in part by helping to coordinate members. Although our legislative theories tend to focus on the conflicts among legislators—and on the problems of commitment that may prevent them from striking mutually beneficial deals—in reality legislation is an incredibly complex process. Members may all gain by delegating authority to a small set of individuals who can guide the legislature, helping members to coordinate on a concrete

set of action items and to forge a consensus in a world where legislative needs are highly complex and far exceed available plenary time.

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Online Appendix

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A.1 Validating the Parallel Trends Assumption

The causal inferences in the paper rely on the so-called “parallel trends” assumption of the difference-in-differences design. Rather than make a naive comparison of the campaign receipts of leaders and non-leaders, we instead compare the *change* in contributions a candidate receives before and after she becomes the leader to the change in contributions over the same time period among candidates who do not become leaders. This addresses any common, unobserved time factors that would bias a simple within-comparison of contributions over time. However, it relies on the assumption that the change over time in the “control” units provides an accurate counterfactual for the change over time that would have occurred for a given candidate had she not become the majority-party leader.

In this section, we offer evidence that this assumption is plausible by showing how our results are robust to a variety of techniques for relaxing the parallel trends assumption.

A.1.1 State-Year Fixed Effects

In Table A.1, we alter the comparison groups relative to the baseline specification in the paper. Rather than use overall year fixed effects, which account for common temporal shocks at the national level, we include a separate set of year fixed effects for each state, i.e., state-year fixed effects. In essence this performs a difference-in-differences design separately for each state, comparing changes in contributions for leaders and non-leaders, and then weights these together to produce one overall estimate. As the results show, we again find similar, large effects for majority-party leadership.

Table A.1 – State-Year Fixed Effects.

	Log Group Contributions (\$)	Log Total Contributions (\$)	Log Individual Contributions (\$)
Majority-Party Leader	0.47 (0.06)	0.46 (0.06)	0.55 (0.09)
N	36,875	36,875	36,875
Individual Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses.

Table A.2 – State-Chamber-Party-Year Fixed Effects.

	Log Group Contributions (\$)	Log Total Contributions (\$)	Log Individual Contributions (\$)
Majority-Party Leader	0.41 (0.06)	0.41 (0.06)	0.53 (0.08)
N	36,875	36,875	36,875
Individual Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-Chamber-Party-Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses.

A.1.2 State-Chamber-Party-Year Fixed Effects

In Table A.2, we show the the main results are robust to the use of state-chamber-party-year-fixed effects instead of year-fixed effects. In this model, we wash out common shocks to legislators in the same state, chamber, party, and year.

A.1.3 State-Seniority-Year Fixed Effects

In Table A.3, we show the main results when we include state-seniority-year fixed effects. In this design, we partial out all factors that are common to legislators in a given state in a given year who has been in office for the same number of terms.¹⁹

¹⁹The distribution of seniority is positively skewed due to the nature of seniority. There are outliers where state legislators have been in office for 40 years in a row, but this is clearly not the modal case. To ensure meaningful comparisons, we truncated the distribution at 5 terms and code all legislators who was in office for more than 5 terms in the same category. The results are not sensitive to the specific choice of 5 terms.

Table A.3 – State-Seniority-Year Fixed Effects.

	Log Group Contributions (\$)	Log Total Contributions (\$)	Log Individual Contributions (\$)
Majority-Party Leader	0.47 (0.07)	0.47 (0.06)	0.56 (0.09)
N	36,875	36,875	36,875
Individual Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-Seniority-Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses.

A.1.4 Leads and Lags of Treatment


Table A.4 – Leads and Lags of the Treatment.

	Log Group Contributions (\$)	Log Total Contributions (\$)	Log Individual Contributions (\$)
Majority-Party Leader	0.52 (0.14)	0.47 (0.13)	0.53 (0.19)
Leader, $t - 1$	-0.03 (0.18)	0.11 (0.12)	0.12 (0.13)
Leader, $t - 2$	0.06 (0.11)	0.11 (0.10)	0.01 (0.12)
Leader, $t + 1$	0.24 (0.13)	0.25 (0.10)	0.27 (0.13)
Leader, $t + 2$	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.12 (0.11)
N	8,520	8,520	8,520
Individual Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
State Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses.

Finally, in Table A.4, we include two leads and two lags of the treatment variable. The coefficients on the leads are to address the possibility of pre-treatment trending in the treated group; the coefficients on the lags tell us whether the effect aggregates over time after treatment or not. First, consistent with the graph, we do find evidence for a one-term anticipatory effect (Leader, $t + 1$). However, we find no evidence for a more sustained pre-treatment violation, as the coefficients on Leader, $t + 2$ are negligible. And even with these leads included, the main effect on Majority-Party Leader continues to be large and positive. Last, the coefficients on the lags suggest that there is some aggregation of the effect over time.

Figure A.1 – Average Number of Majority Party Leaders Running for Election across States.



A.2 Leadership Positions: Data and Coding

In this section, we present the raw data we use to study leaders, and we review the way in which we coded members of the majority-party leadership in the paper and we show that our results are robust to differing coding choices.

A.2.1 Data on Leaders

Table A.5 provides the precise years for which we see the main leadership positions in which states.

Next, Figure A.1 shows the average number of majority-party leaders we observe running for election in each state, over our entire time period. Darker-shaded states have more leaders.

What are these particular leadership positions, across states? The next five tables show all of our raw data. Each table presents the precise names of each kind of leader in each state for a given chamber.

Table A.5 – Overview of Leadership Positions by State and Year

	Majority Leader	Speaker of the House	President Pro Tem
AL	02 06 98	02 06 90 94 98	02 06 90 94 98
AK	00 02 04 06 08 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	
AZ	02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98		92 94 96 98
AR	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96	02 04 92 96 98
CA	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 92 94 96 98	00 04 94 96
CO	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 06 08 90 94 98
CT	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98
DE	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 06 08 90 92 96
FL	00 02 04 06 08 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	02 04 08 92 96 98
GA	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 94 96 98
HI	00 02 04 06 08 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	
ID	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98
IL	00 02 04 06 08 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 90 92 94 96 98	08
IN	00 02 04 06 08 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	02 04 08 90 94 98
IA	00 02 04 06 08 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 08 90 92 96
KS	00 02 04 08 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 94 96 98	
KY	00 02 04 06 08 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 06 92 96
LA		07 91 95	03 07 91 95 99
ME	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00
MD	02 06 90 94 98	90 94 98	02 06 90 94 98
MA	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	02 04 06
MI	00 02 04 06 90 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	02 06 90 94 98
MN	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	06
MS	07	03 07 91 95 99	03 07 91 95 99
MO	00 02 04 06 08 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 04 08 92 94 96
MT	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 04 08 90 92
NE			
NV	00 02 04 06 90 92 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	02 06 08 90
NH	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 90 92 94	00 02 04 06 90 94 96 98
NJ	01 03 07 91 93 97		01 03 07 91 93 97
NM	00 02 04 06 08 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 04 08 92 96
NY	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98
NC	00 02 04 06 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98
ND	00 04 08 90 92 96		00 04 90 92 96 98
OH	00 02 04 06 08 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 04 08 90 96
OK	00 02 04 06 08 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	04 06 90 94
OR	00 02 04 06 08 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 04 08 90 94 98
PA	00 02 04 06 08 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	02 04 08 90 94 98
RI	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 96 98
SC	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 04 08 92 96
SD	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98		00 02 04 06 90 92 94 98
TN	00 02 04 06 08 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 06 92 94 96 98	
TX		00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 90 94 98
UT	00 02 04 06 08 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	
VT	00 94 96	00 02	94
VA	01 03 05 07 91 93 95 97 99	01 03 05 07 91 93 95 97 99	03 07 91 95 99
WA	00 02 04 06 08 90 92 94 96	00 02 04 06 92 94 96 98	00 02 06 92 94 96 98
WV			
WI	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 06 94 96
WY	00 02 04 06 08 90 92 94 96 98	00 02 04 06 92 94 96 98	

Table A.6 – Speaker of the State Houses: AK-MT.

State	Chamber	Name	Party	Leader Period	Sample Period	State	Chamber	Name	Party	Leader Period	Sample Period
AK	House	GRUSSENDORF, BEN	Dem	1990 - 1990	1990 - 1998	AK	House	BARNES, RAMONA L.	Rep	1992 - 1992	1990 - 1998
AK	House	PHILLIPS, GAIL	Rep	1994 - 1996	1990 - 1998	AK	House	PORTER, BRIAN	Rep	1998 - 2000	1992 - 2000
AK	House	KOTT, PETE	Rep	2002 - 2002	1992 - 2004	AK	House	HARRIS, JOHN L.	Rep	2004 - 2006	1998 - 2008
AK	House	CHENAULT, CHARLES M.	Rep	2010 - 2010	2000 - 2012	AL	House	HAMMETT, SETH	Dem	1998 - 2006	1998 - 2006
AL	House	HUBBARD, MIKE	Rep	2010 - 2010	1998 - 2010	AR	House	BROADWAY, SHANE	Dem	2000 - 2000	2000 - 2006
AR	House	CLEVELAND, HERSCHEL W.	Dem	2002 - 2002	2000 - 2002	AR	House	STOVALL, BILL H. III	Dem	2004 - 2004	2000 - 2004
AR	House	PETRUS, BENNY	Dem	2006 - 2006	2002 - 2006	AR	House	MOORE, ROBERT S. JR.	Dem	2010 - 2010	2006 - 2010
AZ	House	GROSCOST, JEFF	Rep	1996 - 1998	1996 - 1998	AZ	House	WEIERS, JAMES (JIM)	Rep	2000 - 2006	1996 - 2010
AZ	House	FLAKE, JAKE	Rep	2002 - 2002	1996 - 2006	AZ	House	ADAMS, KIRK	Rep	2010 - 2010	2006 - 2010
CA	House	VILLARAIGOSA, ANTONIO R.	Dem	1998 - 1998	1998 - 1998	CA	House	WESSON, HERB	Dem	2000 - 2000	1998 - 2002
CA	House	NUNEZ, FABIAN	Dem	2002 - 2006	2002 - 2006	CA	House	PEREZ, JOHN A.	Dem	2010 - 2010	2008 - 2012
CO	House	BERRY, CHARLES E. (CHUCK)	Rep	1996 - 1996	1996 - 1996	CO	House	GEORGE, RUSSELL	Rep	1998 - 1998	1996 - 1998
CO	House	DEAN, DOUGLAS ALLEN (DOUG)	Rep	2000 - 2000	1996 - 2000	CO	House	SPRADLEY, LOLA	Rep	2002 - 2002	1998 - 2002
CO	House	ROMANOFF, ANDREW	Dem	2004 - 2006	2000 - 2006	CO	House	MCNULTY, FRANK	Rep	2010 - 2010	2006 - 2012
CT	House	LYONS, MOIRA K.	Dem	1998 - 2002	1998 - 2002	CT	House	AMANN, JAMES A.	Dem	2004 - 2006	1998 - 2006
CT	House	DONOVAN, CHRISTOPHER G.	Dem	2010 - 2010	1998 - 2010	DE	House	SPENCE, TERRY	Rep	2000 - 2006	2000 - 2006
DE	House	GILLIGAN, ROBERT F.	Dem	2010 - 2010	2000 - 2010	FL	House	THRASHER, JOHN	Rep	1998 - 1998	1998 - 2012
FL	House	FEENEY, TOM	Rep	2000 - 2000	1998 - 2000	FL	House	BYRD, JOHNNIE B. JR.	Rep	2002 - 2002	1998 - 2002
FL	House	BENSE, ALLAN GEORGE	Rep	2004 - 2004	1998 - 2004	FL	House	RUBIO, MARCO	Rep	2006 - 2006	2000 - 2006
FL	House	CANNON, R. DEAN JR.	Rep	2010 - 2010	2004 - 2010	GA	House	MURPHY, THOMAS B.	Dem	1996 - 2000	1996 - 2000
GA	House	COLEMAN, TERRY L.	Dem	2002 - 2002	1996 - 2004	GA	House	RICHARDSON, GLENN	Rep	2004 - 2006	1996 - 2008
GA	House	RALSTON, DAVID	Rep	2010 - 2010	1992 - 2012	HI	House	SAY, CALVIN K. Y.	Dem	1998 - 2010	1998 - 2012
HI	House	OSHIRO, MARCUS R.	Dem	1998 - 1998	1998 - 2012	HI	House	LUKE, SYLVIA	Dem	2000 - 2002	1998 - 2012
HI	House	TAKAI, K. MARK	Dem	2004 - 2004	1998 - 2012	IA	House	SIEGRIST, BRENT	Rep	1998 - 2000	1998 - 2000
IA	House	RANTS, CHRISTOPHER	Rep	2002 - 2004	1998 - 2008	IA	House	MURPHY, PAT	Dem	2006 - 2006	1998 - 2012
IA	House	PAULSEN, KRAIG	Rep	2010 - 2010	2002 - 2012	ID	House	BOYD, TOM	Rep	1990 - 1990	1990 - 1990
ID	House	SIMPSON, MICHAEL K.	Rep	1992 - 1996	1990 - 1996	ID	House	NEWCOMB, BRUCE	Rep	1998 - 2004	1990 - 2004
ID	House	DENNEY, LAWRENCE	Rep	2006 - 2010	1990 - 2012	IL	House	MADIGAN, MICHAEL	Dem	1996 - 2010	1996 - 2012
IN	House	MANNWEILER, PAUL S.	Rep	1994 - 1994	1994 - 2000	IN	House	GREGG, JOHN	Dem	1996 - 2000	1994 - 2000
IN	House	BAUER, B. PATRICK	Dem	2002 - 2006	1994 - 2012	IN	House	BOSMA, BRIAN C.	Rep	2004 - 2010	1994 - 2012
KS	House	SHALLENBURGER, TIM	Rep	1996 - 1996	1996 - 1996	KS	House	JENNISON, ROBIN	Rep	1998 - 1998	1996 - 1998
KS	House	GLASSCOCK, KENT	Rep	2000 - 2000	1996 - 2000	KS	House	MAYS, DOUGLAS	Rep	2002 - 2004	1996 - 2004
KS	House	NEUFELD, MELVIN J.	Rep	2006 - 2006	1996 - 2008	KS	House	ONEAL, MICHAEL R.	Rep	2010 - 2010	1996 - 2010
KY	House	RICHARDS, WALTER D. (JODY)	Dem	1994 - 2006	1994 - 2012	KY	House	STUMBO, GREGORY D.	Dem	2010 - 2010	1994 - 2012
LA	House	DEWITT, CHARLES W. JR.	Dem	1999 - 1999	1999 - 2003	LA	House	SALTER, JOE R.	Dem	2003 - 2003	1999 - 2003
LA	House	TUCKER, JAMES W. (JIM)	Rep	2007 - 2007	2003 - 2007	MA	House	FINNERAN, THOMAS M.	Dem	1998 - 2002	1998 - 2004
MA	House	DIMASI, SALVATORE F.	Dem	2004 - 2006	1998 - 2008	MA	House	DELEO, ROBERT A.	Dem	2010 - 2010	1998 - 2012
MD	House	TAYLOR, CASPER R. JR.	Dem	1998 - 1998	1998 - 1998	MD	House	BUSCH, MICHAEL ERIN	Dem	2002 - 2010	1998 - 2010
ME	House	MITCHELL, J. ELIZABETH	Dem	1996 - 1996	1996 - 1996	ME	House	ROWE, G. STEVEN	Dem	1998 - 1998	1996 - 1998
ME	House	SAXL, MICHAEL V.	Dem	2000 - 2000	1996 - 2000	ME	House	COLWELL, PATRICK	Dem	2002 - 2002	1996 - 2002
ME	House	RICHARDSON, JOHN G.	Dem	2004 - 2004	1998 - 2004	ME	House	CUMMINGS, GLENN	Dem	2006 - 2006	2000 - 2006
ME	House	NUTTING, ROBERT W.	Rep	2010 - 2010	1998 - 2012	MI	House	HERTEL, CURTIS	Dem	1996 - 1996	1996 - 1996
MI	House	PERRICONE, CHARLES	Rep	1998 - 1998	1996 - 1998	MI	House	JOHNSON, RICK	Rep	2000 - 2002	1998 - 2002
MI	House	DEROCHE, CRAIG	Rep	2004 - 2004	2002 - 2006	MI	House	DILLON, ANDY	Dem	2006 - 2006	2004 - 2008
MI	House	BOLGER, JAMES	Rep	2010 - 2010	2008 - 2012	MN	House	CARRUTHERS, PHIL	Dem	1996 - 1996	1996 - 1998
MN	House	SVIGGUM, STEVE	Rep	1998 - 2004	1996 - 2006	MN	House	KELLIHER, MARGARET ANDERSON	Dem	2006 - 2006	1998 - 2008
MO	House	GAW, STEVE	Dem	1996 - 1998	1996 - 1998	MO	House	KREIDER, JIM	Dem	2000 - 2000	1996 - 2000
MO	House	HANAWAY, CATHERINE L.	Rep	2002 - 2002	1998 - 2002	MO	House	JETTON, ROD	Rep	2004 - 2006	2000 - 2006
MO	House	TILLEY, STEVEN	Rep	2010 - 2010	2004 - 2010	MS	House	FORD, TIM	Dem	1999 - 1999	1999 - 1999
MS	House	MCCOY, WILLIAM J. (BILLY)	Dem	2003 - 2007	2003 - 2007	MT	House	HARPER, HAL	Dem	1990 - 1990	1990 - 1998
MT	House	MERCER, JOHN A.	Rep	1992 - 1998	1990 - 1998	MT	House	MCGEE, DANIEL W.	Rep	2000 - 2000	1994 - 2006
MT	House	MOOD, DOUGLAS	Rep	2002 - 2002	1996 - 2002	MT	House	MATTHEWS, GARY	Dem	2004 - 2004	1998 - 2004
MT	House	SALES, SCOTT	Rep	2006 - 2006	2002 - 2012	MT	House	MILBURN, MIKE	Rep	2010 - 2010	2004 - 2010

Table A.7 – Speaker of the State Houses: NC-WY.

State	Chamber	Name	Party	Leader Period	Sample Period	State	Chamber	Name	Party	Leader Period	Sample Period
NC	House	BRUBAKER, HAROLD J.	Rep	1996 - 1996	1996 - 2010	NC	House	BLACK, JIM B. (JIM)	Dem	1998 - 2004	1996 - 2006
NC	House	MORGAN, RICHARD T.	Rep	2002 - 2002	1996 - 2004	NC	House	HACKNEY, JOE	Dem	2006 - 2006	1996 - 2010
NC	House	TILLIS, THOM	Rep	2010 - 2010	2006 - 2012	ND	House	BERNSTEIN, LEROY G.	Rep	1998 - 1998	1998 - 2002
ND	House	WALD, FRANCIS	Rep	1998 - 1998	1998 - 2006	ND	House	DELZER, JEFF	Rep	2004 - 2004	1998 - 2012
ND	House	KLEIN, MATTHEW M. (MATT)	Rep	2004 - 2004	2004 - 2012	ND	House	DROVDAL, DAVID (SKIP)	Rep	2010 - 2010	1998 - 2010
NH	House	SYTEK, DONNA P.	Rep	1998 - 1998	1998 - 1998	NH	House	NORELLI, TERIE	Dem	2006 - 2006	2002 - 2012
NH	House	OBRIEN, WILLIAM L.	Rep	2010 - 2010	2004 - 2012	NJ	House	COLLINS, JACK	Rep	1997 - 1999	1997 - 1999
NJ	House	SIRES, ALBIO	Dem	2001 - 2003	1999 - 2005	NJ	House	ROBERTS, JOSEPH J. JR.	Dem	2005 - 2007	1997 - 2007
NJ	House	OLIVER, SHEILA Y.	Dem	2009 - 2009	2003 - 2011	NM	House	SANCHEZ, RAYMOND	Dem	1992 - 1998	1992 - 1998
NM	House	LUJAN, BEN	Dem	2000 - 2010	1992 - 2010	NV	House	DINI, JOSEPH E.	Dem	1990 - 1998	1990 - 2000
NV	House	HETTRICK, LYNN	Rep	1994 - 1994	1992 - 2004	NV	House	PERKINS, RICHARD	Dem	2000 - 2004	1992 - 2004
NV	House	BUCKLEY, BARBARA	Dem	2006 - 2006	1994 - 2008	NV	House	OCEGUERA, JOHN	Dem	2010 - 2010	2000 - 2010
NY	House	SILVER, SHELDON	Other	1998 - 2010	1998 - 2012	OH	House	DAVIDSON, JO ANN	Rep	1996 - 1998	1996 - 1998
OH	House	HOUSEHOLDER, LARRY	Rep	2000 - 2002	1996 - 2002	OH	House	HUSTED, JON	Rep	2004 - 2006	2000 - 2008
OH	House	BATCHELDER, WILLIAM	Rep	2010 - 2010	1996 - 2012	OK	House	ADAIR, LARRY E.	Dem	2000 - 2002	2000 - 2002
OK	House	BENSON, LOYD L.	Dem	2000 - 2000	2000 - 2000	OK	House	HIETT, TODD	Rep	2004 - 2004	2000 - 2004
OK	House	CARGILL, LANCE	Rep	2006 - 2006	2000 - 2006	OK	House	STEELE, KRIS	Rep	2010 - 2010	2000 - 2010
OR	House	CAMPBELL, LARRY L.	Rep	1990 - 1992	1990 - 1992	OR	House	CLARNO, BEVERLY A.	Rep	1994 - 1994	1992 - 2000
OR	House	LUNDQUIST, LYNN R.	Rep	1996 - 1996	1994 - 1998	OR	House	SNODGRASS, LYNN	Rep	1998 - 1998	1994 - 1998
OR	House	SIMMONS, MARK	Rep	2000 - 2000	1996 - 2000	OR	House	MINNIS, KAREN	Rep	2002 - 2004	1998 - 2006
OR	House	MERKLEY, JEFF	Dem	2006 - 2006	1998 - 2006	OR	House	HANNA, BRUCE L.	Rep	2010 - 2010	2004 - 2012
OR	House	ROBLAN, ARNIE	Dem	2010 - 2010	2004 - 2012	PA	House	RYAN, MATTHEW J.	Rep	1998 - 2000	1998 - 2002
PA	House	PERZEL, JOHN M.	Rep	2002 - 2004	1998 - 2008	PA	House	OBRIEN, DENNIS M.	Rep	2006 - 2006	1998 - 2010
PA	House	SMITH, SAM	Rep	2010 - 2010	1998 - 2012	RI	House	HARWOOD, JOHN B.	Dem	1994 - 2000	1994 - 2002
RI	House	MURPHY, WILLIAM J. 1	Dem	2002 - 2006	1994 - 2008	RI	House	FOX, GORDON	Dem	2010 - 2010	1994 - 2012
SC	House	WILKINS, DAVID	Rep	1996 - 2002	1996 - 2004	SC	House	HARRELL, ROBERT W. JR.	Rep	2004 - 2010	1996 - 2012
SD	House	ECCARIUS, SCOTT	Rep	2000 - 2000	2000 - 2000	SD	House	MICHELS, MATTHEW	Rep	2002 - 2004	2000 - 2004
SD	House	DEADRICK, THOMAS J.	Rep	2006 - 2006	2002 - 2008	SD	House	RAUSCH, VALENTINE (VAL)	Rep	2010 - 2010	2004 - 2010
TN	House	NAIFEH, JIMMY	Dem	1996 - 2006	1996 - 2010	TN	House	HARWELHALTMAN, BETH	Rep	2010 - 2010	1996 - 2012
TX	House	LANEY, JAMES (PETE)	Dem	1998 - 2000	1998 - 2004	TX	House	CRADDICK, TOM	Rep	2002 - 2006	1998 - 2012
TX	House	STRAUS, JOE	Rep	2010 - 2010	2006 - 2012	UT	House	MOODY, H. CRAIG	Rep	1990 - 1990	1990 - 1990
UT	House	BROWN, MELVIN R.	Rep	1996 - 1996	1990 - 2012	UT	House	STEPHENS, MARTIN	Rep	1998 - 2002	1990 - 2002
UT	House	CURTIS, GREG J.	Rep	2004 - 2006	1996 - 2006	UT	House	LOCKHART, BECKY	Rep	2010 - 2010	1998 - 2012
VA	House	WILKINS, S. VANCE JR.	Rep	1999 - 2001	1999 - 2001	VA	House	HOWELL, WILLIAM J.	Rep	2003 - 2009	1999 - 2011
VT	House	OBUCHOWSKI, MICHAEL J.	Dem	1998 - 1998	1998 - 2010	VT	House	FREED, WALTER	Rep	2000 - 2002	2000 - 2002
VT	House	SYMINGTON, GAYE	Dem	2004 - 2006	1998 - 2006	VT	House	SMITH, SHAP	Dem	2010 - 2010	2002 - 2012
WA	House	EBERSOLE, BRIAN	Dem	1992 - 1992	1990 - 1994	WA	House	BALLARD, CLYDE	Rep	1994 - 1998	1990 - 2000
WA	House	CHOPP, FRANK	Dem	1998 - 2010	1994 - 2012	WI	House	JENSEN, SCOTT R.	Rep	1998 - 2000	1998 - 2004
WI	House	GARD, JOHN	Rep	2002 - 2004	1998 - 2004	WI	House	HUEBSCH, MICHAEL D.	Rep	2006 - 2006	1998 - 2010
WI	House	FITZGERALD, JEFF	Rep	2010 - 2010	2000 - 2010	WV	House	KISS, ROBERT S.	Dem	1998 - 2004	1998 - 2004
WV	House	THOMPSON, RICHARD	Dem	2006 - 2010	2000 - 2012	WY	House	CROSS, WILLIAM RORY	Rep	1990 - 1990	1990 - 1990
WY	House	CHAMBERLAIN, DOUGLAS W.	Rep	1992 - 1992	1990 - 1992	WY	House	MARTON, JOHN P.	Rep	1994 - 1994	1990 - 1994
WY	House	HINCHEY, BRUCE A.	Rep	1996 - 1996	1990 - 1998	WY	House	BEBOUT, ELI	Rep	1998 - 1998	1990 - 2008
WY	House	TEMPEST, RICK	Rep	2000 - 2000	1990 - 2000	WY	House	PARADY, FRED	Rep	2002 - 2002	1994 - 2002
WY	House	LUTHI, RANDALL B.	Rep	2004 - 2004	1994 - 2004	WY	House	COHEE, ROY	Rep	2006 - 2006	1998 - 2008
WY	House	BUCHANAN, EDWARD A.	Rep	2010 - 2010	2002 - 2010						

Table A.8 – President Pro Tempore of State Senates.

State	Chamber	Name	Party	Leader Period	Sample Period	State	Chamber	Name	Party	Leader Period	Sample Period
AL	Senate	BARRON, LOWELL	Dem	1998 - 2002	1998 - 2006	AL	Senate	MITCHEM, HINTON	Dem	2006 - 2006	1998 - 2006
AL	Senate	MARSH, DEL	Rep	2010 - 2010	1998 - 2010	AR	Senate	HILL, JIM	Dem	2002 - 2002	2000 - 2004
AR	Senate	CRITCHER, JACK L.	Dem	2004 - 2004	2002 - 2004	AR	Senate	ARGUE, JIM JR.	Dem	2004 - 2004	2000 - 2004
AR	Senate	BOOKOUT, PAUL	Dem	2010 - 2010	2000 - 2012	AZ	Senate	WETTAW, JOHN F.	Rep	1996 - 1998	1996 - 1998
AZ	Senate	ALLEN, SYLVIA TENNEY	Rep	2010 - 2010	2008 - 2010	CA	Senate	BURTON, JOHN L.	Dem	2000 - 2000	2000 - 2000
CA	Senate	PERATA, DON	Dem	2004 - 2004	1998 - 2004	CA	Senate	STEINBERG, DARRELL	Dem	2010 - 2010	1998 - 2010
CO	Senate	PERLMUTTER, EDWIN G.	Dem	1998 - 1998	1998 - 1998	CO	Senate	LAMBORN, DOUGLAS L.	Rep	1998 - 1998	1996 - 2002
CO	Senate	CHLOUBER, KEN	Rep	2000 - 2000	1996 - 2000	CO	Senate	TAPIA, ABEL J.	Dem	2006 - 2006	1998 - 2006
CO	Senate	BOYD, BETTY	Dem	2008 - 2008	2000 - 2008	CT	Senate	SULLIVAN, KEVIN B.	Dem	1996 - 2002	1996 - 2002
CT	Senate	WILLIAMS, DONALD E. JR.	Dem	2004 - 2010	1996 - 2012	DE	Senate	ADAMS, THURMAN JR.	Dem	2002 - 2002	2002 - 2002
FL	Senate	BROWNWAITE, VIRGINIA (GINNY)	Rep	1998 - 1998	1998 - 1998	FL	Senate	DIAZDELAPORTILLA, ALEX	Rep	2002 - 2002	1998 - 2006
FL	Senate	CLARY, CHARLIE	Rep	2002 - 2002	2000 - 2002	FL	Senate	CARLTON, LISA	Rep	2004 - 2004	1998 - 2004
FL	Senate	BENNETT, MICHAEL S.	Rep	2008 - 2008	2000 - 2008	GA	Senate	RAY, WALTER	Dem	1994 - 1994	1992 - 1994
GA	Senate	PERDUE, SONNY	Dem	1996 - 1996	1992 - 2000	GA	Senate	STARR, TERRELL A.	Dem	1998 - 2000	1992 - 2004
GA	Senate	JOHNSON, ERIC	Rep	2002 - 2006	1994 - 2008	GA	Senate	WILLIAMS, TOM	Rep	2010 - 2010	1998 - 2012
IA	Senate	ANGELO, JEFF	Rep	2000 - 2000	2000 - 2004	IA	Senate	MCKEAN, ANDY	Rep	2000 - 2000	2000 - 2000
IA	Senate	DVORSKY, ROBERT E.	Dem	2002 - 2002	1998 - 2010	IA	Senate	DANIELSON, JEFF	Dem	2004 - 2008	2004 - 2012
ID	Senate	CRAPO, MICHAEL D. (MIKE)	Rep	1990 - 1990	1990 - 1990	ID	Senate	TWIGGS, JERRY T.	Rep	1992 - 1996	1990 - 1998
ID	Senate	GEDDES, ROBERT L. JR.	Rep	1998 - 2006	1996 - 2010	ID	Senate	HILL, BRENT	Rep	2010 - 2010	2002 - 2012
IL	Senate	HARMON, DON	Dem	2008 - 2008	2002 - 2012	IN	Senate	GARTON, ROBERT D.	Rep	1994 - 2002	1994 - 2002
IN	Senate	LONG, DAVID C.	Rep	2004 - 2008	1996 - 2012	KY	Senate	BLEVINS, DR. WALTER (DOC)	Dem	1996 - 1996	1996 - 2012
KY	Senate	ROEDING, RICHARD L. (DICK)	Rep	1996 - 2000	1996 - 2004	KY	Senate	STINE, KATIE KRATZ	Rep	2002 - 2010	1994 - 2010
LA	Senate	LAMBERT, LOUIS J. JR.	Dem	1999 - 1999	1999 - 1999	LA	Senate	BAJOIE, DIANA E.	Dem	2003 - 2003	1999 - 2003
LA	Senate	WESTONBROOME, SHARON	Dem	2007 - 2007	1999 - 2011	MA	Senate	ROSENBERG, STANLEY C.	Dem	2002 - 2010	1998 - 2012
MD	Senate	RUBEN, IDA G.	Dem	1998 - 2002	1998 - 2002	MD	Senate	MCFADDEN, NATHANIEL J.	Dem	2006 - 2010	1998 - 2010
ME	Senate	MICHAUD, MICHAEL H.	Dem	2000 - 2000	1996 - 2000	MI	Senate	SCHWARZ, JOHN	Rep	1998 - 1998	1998 - 1998
MI	Senate	VAUGHN, JACKIE III	Dem	1998 - 1998	1998 - 1998	MI	Senate	BIRKHOLZ, PATRICIA	Rep	2002 - 2002	1996 - 2006
MI	Senate	BARCIA, JAMES	Dem	2002 - 2006	2002 - 2006	MI	Senate	RICHARDVILLE, RANDY	Rep	2006 - 2006	1998 - 2010
MI	Senate	GLEASON, JOHN	Dem	2010 - 2010	2002 - 2010	MI	Senate	SCHUTTMAKER, TONYA	Rep	2010 - 2010	2004 - 2010
MN	Senate	FREDERICKSON, DENNIS 1	Rep	2006 - 2006	1996 - 2006	MN	Senate	OLSON, GEN	Rep	2010 - 2010	1996 - 2010
MO	Senate	KINDER, PETER	Rep	2000 - 2000	2000 - 2000	MO	Senate	GIBBONS, MICHAEL R.	Rep	2004 - 2004	1996 - 2004
MO	Senate	MAYER, ROBERT	Rep	2008 - 2008	2000 - 2008	MS	Senate	LITTLE, TRAVIS L.	Dem	1999 - 2003	1999 - 2003
MS	Senate	HEWES, BILLY III	Rep	2007 - 2007	1999 - 2007	MT	Senate	LYNCH, JOHN J. D.	Dem	1990 - 1992	1990 - 1996
MT	Senate	MCNUTT, WALTER L.	Rep	2000 - 2000	1996 - 2010	MT	Senate	HARRINGTON, DAN W.	Dem	2004 - 2004	1990 - 2004
MT	Senate	TUTVEDT, BRUCE	Rep	2008 - 2008	2008 - 2012	NC	Senate	BASNIGHT, MARC	Dem	1996 - 2006	1996 - 2010
NC	Senate	BERGER, PHILIP E. (PHIL)	Rep	2010 - 2010	2000 - 2012	ND	Senate	BOWMAN, BILL	Rep	1998 - 1998	1998 - 2010
ND	Senate	URLACHER, HERBERT	Rep	2000 - 2000	2000 - 2004	ND	Senate	COOK, DWIGHT	Rep	2004 - 2004	2000 - 2012
ND	Senate	ANDRIST, JOHN	Rep	2004 - 2004	2000 - 2012	ND	Senate	WARDNER, RICHARD P.	Rep	2010 - 2010	1998 - 2010
NH	Senate		Other	1996 - 1996	1996 - 1996	NH	Senate	LARSEN, SYLVIA B.	Dem	1998 - 1998	1996 - 2012
NH	Senate	JOHNSON, CARL R.	Rep	2000 - 2004	1996 - 2004	NH	Senate	HASSAN, MAGGIE WOOD	Dem	2006 - 2006	2004 - 2008
NH	Senate	BARNES, JOHN S. JR.	Rep	2010 - 2010	1996 - 2010	NJ	Senate	PALAI, JOSEPH A.	Rep	1997 - 2001	1997 - 2003
NJ	Senate	TURNER, SHIRLEY K.	Dem	2001 - 2007	1997 - 2011	NJ	Senate	GILL, NIA H.	Dem	2007 - 2007	1997 - 2011
NM	Senate	ARAGON, MANNY M.	Dem	1992 - 1996	1992 - 2000	NM	Senate	ROMERO, RICHARD M.	Dem	2000 - 2000	1992 - 2000
NM	Senate	ALTAMIRANO, BEN D.	Dem	2004 - 2004	1992 - 2004	NM	Senate	JENNINGS, TIMOTHY Z.	Dem	2008 - 2008	1992 - 2008
NV	Senate	JACOBSEN, LAWRENCE	Rep	1990 - 1990	1990 - 1994	NV	Senate	SCHNEIDER, MIKE	Dem	2008 - 2008	1992 - 2008
NY	Senate	JOHNSON, OWEN H.	Other	1998 - 2000	1998 - 2010	NY	Senate	BRUNO, JOSEPH L.	Other	1998 - 2002	1998 - 2006
NY	Senate	PADAVAN, FRANK	Other	2002 - 2006	1998 - 2008	NY	Senate	MAZIARZ, GEORGE D.	Rep	2010 - 2010	1998 - 2012
OH	Senate	CUPP, ROBERT R.	Rep	1996 - 1996	1996 - 1996	OH	Senate	GARDNER, RANDALL	Rep	2000 - 2000	1996 - 2012
OH	Senate	JACOBSON, JEFF	Rep	2004 - 2004	1996 - 2004	OH	Senate	FABER, KEITH	Rep	2008 - 2008	2000 - 2012
OK	Senate	MORGAN, MIKE	Dem	2004 - 2004	2000 - 2004	OK	Senate	COFFEE, GLENN	Rep	2006 - 2006	2002 - 2006
OK	Senate	BINGMAN, BRIAN	Rep	2010 - 2010	2004 - 2010	OR	Senate	ROBERTS, FRANK	Dem	1990 - 1990	1990 - 1990
OR	Senate	YIH, MAE	Dem	1990 - 1990	1990 - 1998	OR	Senate	KINTIGH, BOB	Rep	1994 - 1994	1990 - 1994
OR	Senate	HANNON, LENN	Rep	1994 - 1994	1990 - 2002	OR	Senate	HARTUNG, TOM	Rep	1998 - 1998	1994 - 1998
OR	Senate	FERRIOLI, TED	Rep	2000 - 2000	1996 - 2012	OR	Senate	CARTER, MARGARET	Dem	2004 - 2004	1990 - 2008
OR	Senate	BURDICK, GINNY	Dem	2008 - 2008	1996 - 2012	PA	Senate	JUBELIRER, ROBERT C.	Rep	1998 - 2002	1998 - 2002
PA	Senate	SCARNATI, JOSEPH B. III	Rep	2004 - 2008	2000 - 2012	RI	Senate	FOGARTY, CHARLES J.	Dem	1996 - 1996	1994 - 1996
RI	Senate	WALTON, CHARLES D.	Dem	1998 - 1998	1994 - 2000	RI	Senate	REVEN, JOHN C. JR.	Dem	2000 - 2006	1994 - 2006
SC	Senate	DRUMMOND, JOHN W.	Dem	1996 - 1996	1996 - 2004	SC	Senate	MCCONNELL, GLENN F.	Rep	2000 - 2008	1996 - 2008
SD	Senate	BROWN, ARNOLD M.	Rep	2000 - 2002	2000 - 2002	SD	Senate	SCHOENBECK, LEE	Rep	2004 - 2004	2002 - 2004
SD	Senate	GRAY, BOB	Rep	2006 - 2010	2004 - 2010	TX	Senate	ELLIS, RODNEY	Dem	1998 - 1998	1998 - 2012
TX	Senate	MONCRIEF, MIKE	Dem	2000 - 2000	2000 - 2000	TX	Senate	MADLA, FRANK	Dem	2002 - 2002	1998 - 2002
TX	Senate	NELSON, JANE	Rep	2002 - 2002	2000 - 2012	TX	Senate	OGDEN, STEVE	Rep	2010 - 2010	1998 - 2010
VA	Senate	CHICHESTER, JOHN H.	Rep	1999 - 2003	1999 - 2003	VA	Senate	COLGAN, CHARLES J.	Dem	2007 - 2007	1999 - 2011
VT	Senate		Other	1996 - 2006	1996 - 2008	VT	Senate	WELCH, PETER F.	Dem	2002 - 2004	2002 - 2004
VT	Senate	CAMPBELL, JOHN F.	Dem	2010 - 2010	2000 - 2012	WA	Senate	WOJAHN, LORRAINE	Dem	1992 - 1996	1992 - 1996
WA	Senate	MORTON, BOB	Rep	1994 - 1994	1990 - 2010	WA	Senate	NEWHOUSE, IRVING	Rep	1994 - 1994	1990 - 1994
WA	Senate	BAUER, ALBERT	Dem	1996 - 1996	1992 - 1996	WA	Senate	FRANKLIN, ROSA	Dem	1998 - 2006	1990 - 2006
WA	Senate	SHIN, PAULL H.	Dem	1998 - 2010	1992 - 2010	WA	Senate	WINSLEY, SHIRLEY	Rep	2000 - 2000	1990 - 2000
WA	Senate	DECCIO, ALEX	Rep	2000 - 2000	1992 - 2004	WA	Senate	PRENTICE, MARGARITA	Dem	2008 - 2008	1990 - 2008
WI	Senate	GEORGE, GARY R.	Dem	2000 - 2000	2000 - 2000	WI	Senate	WELCH, ROBERT T.	Rep	2000 - 2000	2000 - 2000
WI	Senate	ZIEN, DAVID A.	Rep	2002 - 2002	1998 - 2002	WI	Senate	CARPENTER, TIMOTHY W.	Dem	2006 - 2006	1998 - 2010
WI	Senate	LEIBHAM, JOSEPH K.	Rep	2010 - 2010	1998 - 2010	WV	Senate	SHARPE, WILLIAM JR.	Dem	2000 - 2004	2000 - 2004
WV	Senate	MCCABE, BROOKS	Dem	2010 - 2010	1998 - 2010						

Table A.9 – Majority Leaders of State Senates.

State	Chamber	Name	Party	Leader Period	Sample Period	State	Chamber	Name	Party	Leader Period	Sample Period
AK	Senate	TAYLOR, ROBIN L.	Rep	1992 - 1992	1990 - 2000	AK	Senate	HALFORD, RICHARD (RICK)	Rep	1992 - 1992	1992 - 2000
AK	Senate	LEMAN, LOREN	Rep	2000 - 2000	1990 - 2000	AL	Senate	BUTLER, TOM	Dem	1998 - 1998	1998 - 2006
AL	Senate	LITTLE, ZEB	Dem	2002 - 2006	1998 - 2006	AL	Senate	ENFINGER, JEFF	Dem	2002 - 2002	1998 - 2002
AL	Senate	WAGGONER, JAMES T. (JABO)	Rep	2010 - 2010	1998 - 2010	AR	Senate	MALONE, PERCY	Dem	2002 - 2004	2000 - 2004
AR	Senate	STEELE, TRACY	Dem	2006 - 2006	2000 - 2010	AR	Senate	THOMPSON, ROBERT F.	Dem	2010 - 2010	2004 - 2012
AZ	Senate	SPITZER, MARC	Rep	1996 - 1996	1996 - 1998	AZ	Senate	BOWERS, RUSSELL WESLEY	Rep	1998 - 1998	1996 - 2000
AZ	Senate	BEE, TIM	Rep	2002 - 2004	2000 - 2006	AZ	Senate	VERSCHOOR, THAYER	Rep	2006 - 2006	2002 - 2008
AZ	Senate	BUNDGAARD, SCOTT	Rep	2010 - 2010	1996 - 2010	CA	Senate	POLANCO, RICHARD	Dem	1998 - 1998	1998 - 1998
CA	Senate	PERATA, DON	Dem	2000 - 2000	1998 - 2004	CA	Senate	ROMERO, GLORIA	Dem	2002 - 2006	1998 - 2006
CA	Senate	CORBETT, ELLEN M.	Dem	2010 - 2010	1998 - 2010	CO	Senate	BLICKENSDEFER, TOM	Rep	1996 - 1996	1996 - 1996
CO	Senate	THIEBAUT, WILLIAM BILL JR.	Dem	1998 - 1998	1998 - 1998	CO	Senate	HILLMAN, MARK D.	Rep	2002 - 2002	1998 - 2002
CO	Senate	ANDERSON, NORMA	Rep	2002 - 2002	1996 - 2002	CO	Senate	GORDON, KEN	Dem	2004 - 2004	1996 - 2004
CO	Senate	MORSE, JOHN	Dem	2010 - 2010	2006 - 2010	CT	Senate	JEPSEN, GEORGE	Dem	1996 - 2000	1996 - 2000
CT	Senate	LOONEY, MARTIN M.	Dem	2002 - 2010	1996 - 2012	DE	Senate	MCDOWELL, HARRIS B. III	Dem	2002 - 2002	2002 - 2012
FL	Senate	WEBSTER, DANIEL	Rep	2004 - 2004	1998 - 2004	FL	Senate	GARDINER, ANDY	Rep	2008 - 2008	2000 - 2012
GA	Senate	ROBINSON, PETE	Dem	1992 - 1992	1992 - 1992	GA	Senate	PERDUE, SONNY	Dem	1994 - 1994	1992 - 2000
GA	Senate	WALKER, CHARLES W.	Dem	1996 - 2000	1992 - 2004	GA	Senate	WILLIAMS, TOM	Rep	2006 - 2006	1998 - 2012
GA	Senate	ROGERS, CHIP	Rep	2010 - 2010	2002 - 2012	HI	Senate	KAWAMOTO, CALVIN (CAL)	Dem	1998 - 1998	1998 - 2002
HI	Senate	IHARA, LES JR.	Dem	1998 - 1998	1998 - 2012	HI	Senate	CHUN, JONATHAN J.	Dem	1998 - 1998	1998 - 1998
HI	Senate	HANABUSA, COLLEEN	Dem	2002 - 2002	1998 - 2002	HI	Senate	ESPERO, WILLIE C.	Dem	2010 - 2010	2000 - 2012
IA	Senate	IVERSON, STEWART JR.	Rep	1998 - 1998	1998 - 2010	IA	Senate	GRONSTAL, MICHAEL E.	Dem	2004 - 2008	2000 - 2012
ID	Senate	MROBERTS, JOYCE	Rep	1992 - 1992	1990 - 1994	ID	Senate	KERRICK, DAVID E.	Rep	1994 - 1994	1990 - 1994
ID	Senate	RISCH, JAMES E.	Rep	1996 - 2000	1996 - 2000	ID	Senate	DAVIS, BART M.	Rep	2002 - 2010	1998 - 2012
IL	Senate	WEAVER, STANLEY B.	Rep	1996 - 1998	1996 - 1998	IL	Senate	HALVORSON, DEBBIE DEFRANCES	Dem	2002 - 2006	1996 - 2006
IL	Senate	CLAYBORNE, JAMES F. JR.	Dem	2008 - 2008	1996 - 2012	IN	Senate	HARRISON, JOSEPH W.	Rep	1994 - 2002	1994 - 2002
IN	Senate	ADAMS, KENT J.	Rep	1996 - 1996	1996 - 2000	IN	Senate	CLARK, J. MURRAY	Rep	1998 - 1998	1994 - 2002
IN	Senate	LONG, DAVID C.	Rep	2000 - 2000	1996 - 2012	IN	Senate	MILLER, PATRICIA L.	Rep	2004 - 2004	1996 - 2012
IN	Senate	LUBBERS, TERESA SMITH	Rep	2004 - 2004	2000 - 2008	IN	Senate	LAWSON, CONNIE	Rep	2004 - 2008	1996 - 2008
IN	Senate	FORD, DAVID C.	Rep	2006 - 2006	1994 - 2006	IN	Senate	STEELE, BRENT E.	Rep	2008 - 2008	1994 - 2012
KS	Senate	EMERT, TIM	Rep	1996 - 1996	1996 - 1996	KS	Senate	OLEEN, LANA	Rep	2000 - 2000	1996 - 2000
KS	Senate	SCHMIDT, DEREK	Rep	2004 - 2004	2000 - 2008	KS	Senate	EMLER, JAY	Rep	2008 - 2008	2000 - 2012
KY	Senate	KELLY, DAN	Rep	1998 - 2006	1994 - 2006	KY	Senate	STIVERS, ROBERT	Rep	2008 - 2008	1996 - 2012
MA	Senate	MELCONIAN, LINDA J.	Dem	1998 - 2000	1998 - 2002	MA	Senate	BERRY, FREDERICK E.	Dem	2002 - 2010	1998 - 2010
MD	Senate	BLOUNT, CLARENCE W.	Dem	1998 - 1998	1998 - 1998	MD	Senate	MCFADDEN, NATHANIEL J.	Dem	2002 - 2002	1998 - 2010
MD	Senate	KASEMEYER, EDWARD J.	Dem	2006 - 2006	1998 - 2010	MD	Senate	GARAGIOLA, ROB	Dem	2010 - 2010	2002 - 2010
ME	Senate	PINGREE, ROCHELLE M.	Dem	1996 - 1998	1996 - 1998	ME	Senate	TREAT, SHARON	Dem	2002 - 2002	1996 - 2012
ME	Senate	BRENNAN, MICHAEL F.	Dem	2004 - 2004	1996 - 2004	ME	Senate	COURTNEY, JONATHAN T. E.	Rep	2010 - 2010	2002 - 2010
MI	Senate	DEGROW, DAN	Rep	1998 - 1998	1998 - 1998	MI	Senate	SIKKEMA, KEN	Rep	2002 - 2002	1996 - 2002
MI	Senate	BISHOP, MIKE	Rep	2006 - 2006	1998 - 2006	MI	Senate	RICHARDVILLE, RANDY	Rep	2010 - 2010	1998 - 2010
MN	Senate	MOE, ROGER	Dem	1996 - 2000	1996 - 2000	MN	Senate	JOHNSON, DEAN	Dem	2002 - 2002	1996 - 2002
MN	Senate	POGEMILLER, LAWRENCE	Dem	2006 - 2006	1996 - 2010	MN	Senate	KOCH, AMY T.	Rep	2010 - 2010	2006 - 2010
MO	Senate	KENNEY, BILL	Rep	1998 - 1998	1998 - 1998	MO	Senate	SIMS, BETTY	Rep	1998 - 1998	1998 - 1998
MO	Senate	GIBBONS, MICHAEL R.	Rep	2000 - 2000	1996 - 2004	MO	Senate	YECKEL, ANITA T.	Rep	2000 - 2000	2000 - 2000
MO	Senate	NODLER, GARY	Rep	2002 - 2002	2002 - 2006	MO	Senate	SHIELDS, CHARLES W.	Rep	2002 - 2006	1996 - 2006
MO	Senate	GOODMAN, JACK M.	Rep	2008 - 2008	2002 - 2008	MO	Senate	DEMPSEY, TOM	Rep	2008 - 2008	2000 - 2012
MT	Senate	JERGSON, GREG	Dem	1990 - 1990	1990 - 1998	MT	Senate	HARP, JOHN G.	Rep	1992 - 1996	1992 - 1996
MT	Senate	THOMAS, FRED	Rep	2000 - 2000	1990 - 2012	MT	Senate		Dem	2002 - 2002	1994 - 2002
MT	Senate	WILLIAMS, CAROL	Dem	2004 - 2004	1998 - 2008	MT	Senate	ESSMANN, JEFF	Rep	2010 - 2010	2006 - 2010
NC	Senate	COOPER, ROY III	Dem	1996 - 1998	1996 - 1998	NC	Senate	RAND, ANTHONY E. (TONY)	Dem	2000 - 2006	1996 - 2008
NC	Senate	BROWN, HARRY	Rep	2010 - 2010	2004 - 2012	ND	Senate	STENEHJEM, BOB	Rep	2000 - 2008	2000 - 2008
NH	Senate	BARNES, JOHN S. JR.	Rep	1996 - 1996	1996 - 2010	NH	Senate	COHEN, BURT	Dem	1998 - 1998	1996 - 2002
NH	Senate	FRANCOEUR, GARY	Rep	2000 - 2000	1996 - 2000	NH	Senate	CLEGG, ROBERT E. JR.	Rep	2002 - 2004	1998 - 2006
NH	Senate	FOSTER, JOSEPH A.	Dem	2006 - 2006	2002 - 2006	NH	Senate	BRADLEY, JEB 3	Rep	2010 - 2010	2010 - 2012
NJ	Senate	BENNETT, JOHN O.	Rep	1997 - 1997	1997 - 2001	NJ	Senate	SINGER, ROBERT W.	Rep	2001 - 2001	1997 - 2011
NJ	Senate	KENNY, BERNARD F. JR.	Dem	2001 - 2003	1997 - 2003	NJ	Senate	BUCCO, ANTHONY R.	Rep	2001 - 2001	1997 - 2011
NJ	Senate	BUONO, BARBARA A.	Dem	2007 - 2007	1997 - 2011	NJ	Senate	LOPEZ, EDWARD J.	Dem	1992 - 1992	1992 - 1992
NM	Senate	JENNINGS, TIMOTHY Z.	Dem	1996 - 1996	1992 - 2008	NM	Senate	ARAGON, MANNY M.	Dem	2000 - 2000	1992 - 2000
NM	Senate	SANCHEZ, MICHAEL S.	Dem	2004 - 2008	1992 - 2012	NV	Senate	RAWSON, RAY	Rep	1992 - 1992	1992 - 1992
NV	Senate	RAGGIO, WILLIAM	Rep	1992 - 1992	1992 - 2008	NV	Senate	WIENER, VALERIE	Dem	2008 - 2008	2008 - 2008
NY	Senate	BRUNO, JOSEPH L.	Other	1998 - 2006	1998 - 2006	NY	Senate	SKELOS, DEAN G.	Other	2010 - 2010	1998 - 2012
OH	Senate	SPADA, ROBERT	Rep	2004 - 2004	2000 - 2004	OH	Senate	GARDNER, RANDALL	Rep	2004 - 2004	1996 - 2012
OH	Senate	STEWART, JIMMY	Rep	2008 - 2008	2002 - 2008	OK	Senate	ROZELL, HERBERT	Dem	2000 - 2000	2000 - 2000
OK	Senate	CAPPS, GILMER N.	Dem	2002 - 2002	2002 - 2002	OK	Senate	MONSON, ANGELA	Dem	2002 - 2002	2002 - 2002
OK	Senate	GUMM, JAY PAUL	Dem	2002 - 2002	2002 - 2006	OK	Senate	FISHER, TED V.	Dem	2002 - 2002	2002 - 2002
OK	Senate	FORD, JOHN	Rep	2008 - 2008	2004 - 2012	OK	Senate	JOLLEY, CLARK	Rep	2008 - 2008	2004 - 2012
OK	Senate	SCHULZ, MIKE	Rep	2010 - 2010	2006 - 2010	OK	Senate	SYKES, ANTHONY WADE	Rep	2010 - 2010	2006 - 2010
OR	Senate	ADAMS, BRADY	Rep	1992 - 1992	1992 - 1996	OR	Senate	SPRINGER, DICK	Dem	1992 - 1992	1992 - 1992
OR	Senate	DERFLER, GENE	Rep	1994 - 1994	1990 - 1998	OR	Senate	NELSON, DAVID	Rep	2000 - 2000	1996 - 2008
OR	Senate	ROSENBAUM, DIANE	Dem	2008 - 2008	1998 - 2012	PA	Senate	LOEPER, F. JOSEPH	Rep	1998 - 1998	1998 - 1998
PA	Senate	BRIGHTBILL, DAVID J.	Rep	1998 - 2002	1998 - 2002	PA	Senate	PILEGGI, DOMINIC F.	Rep	2004 - 2008	2004 - 2012
RI	Senate	KELLY, PAUL S.	Dem	1994 - 1998	1994 - 2000	RI	Senate	IRONS, WILLIAM V.	Dem	2000 - 2000	1994 - 2002
RI	Senate	PAIVAWOOD, M. TERESA	Dem	2002 - 2006	1994 - 2012	RI	Senate	RUGGERIO, DOMINICK J.	Dem	2010 - 2010	1994 - 2012
SD	Senate	EVERIST, BARBARA	Rep	2000 - 2000	2000 - 2000	SD	Senate	BOGUE, ERIC H.	Rep	2002 - 2004	2000 - 2004
SD	Senate	KNUDSON, DAVID L.	Rep	2006 - 2006	2002 - 2008	SD	Senate	OLSON, RUSSELL	Rep	2010 - 2010	2006 - 2010
TN	Senate	NORRIS, MARK	Rep	2008 - 2008	2000 - 2012	UT	Senate	HILLYARD, LYLE	Rep	1996 - 1996	1996 - 2012
UT	Senate	PETERSON, CRAIG	Rep	1996 - 1996	1996 - 1996	UT	Senate	POULTON, STEVEN	Rep	1998 - 1998	1998 - 1998
UT	Senate	WADDUPS, MICHAEL	Rep	2000 - 2000	1990 - 2008	UT	Senate	KNUDSON, PETER C.	Rep	2002 - 2002	1996 - 2010
UT	Senate	BRAMBLE, CURTIS S.	Rep	2004 - 2004	2000 - 2012	UT	Senate	JENKINS, SCOTT K.	Rep	2008 - 2008	2000 - 2012
VA	Senate	STOSCH, WALTER A.	Rep	1999 - 2003	1999 - 2011	VA	Senate	SASLAW, RICHARD L.	Dem	2007 - 2007	1999 - 2011
VT	Senate	MCCORMACK, RICHARD J. (DICK)	Dem	1996 - 1998	1996 - 2012	VT	Senate	CUMMINGS, ANN	Dem	2000 - 2000	1996 - 2012
VT	Senate		Other	2002 - 2006	2000 - 2012	VT	Senate	CARRIS, BILL	Dem	2010 - 2010	2006 - 2012
WA	Senate	SNYDER, SID	Dem	1992 - 2000	1992 - 2000	WA	Senate	GASPARD, MARCUS S. (MARC)	Dem	1992 - 1992	1992 - 1992
WA	Senate	MCDONALD, DAN	Rep	1994 - 1994	1990 - 1998	WA	Senate	FINKBEINER, BILL	Rep	2002 - 2002	1992 - 2002
WA	Senate	BROWN, LISA J.	Dem	2004 - 2008	1992 - 2008	WA	Senate	EIDE, TRACEY J.	Dem	2006 - 2010	1992 - 2010
WI	Senate	CHIVALA, CHARLES J.	Dem	2000 - 2000	2000 - 2000	WI	Senate	DECKER, RUSSELL S.	Dem	2006 - 2006	1998 - 2006
WI	Senate	FITZGERALD, SCOTT	Rep	2010 - 2010	1998 - 2010	WV	Senate	CHAFIN, H. TRUMAN	Dem	1998 - 2006	1998 - 2010
WV	Senate	UNGER, JOHN II	Dem	2010 - 2010	1998 - 2010	WV	Senate	EDDINS, BOYD L.	Rep	1990 - 1990	1990 - 1992
WY	Senate	COE, HENRY H. R. (HANK)	Rep	1996 - 1996	1992 - 2008	WY	Senate	HINES, JOHN J.	Rep	2006 - 2006	1990 - 2010
WY	Senate	ROSS, TONY	Rep	2008 - 2008	1996 - 2008						

Table A.10 – Majority Leaders of State Houses.

State	Chamber	Name	Party	Leader Period	Sample Period	State	Chamber	Name	Party	Leader Period	Sample Period
AK	House	GRUENBERG, MAX F. JR.	Dem	1990 - 1990	1990 - 2012	AK	House	PHILLIPS, GAIL	Rep	1992 - 1992	1990 - 1998
AK	House	VEZEY, AL	Rep	1994 - 1994	1992 - 1996	AK	House	PORTER, BRIAN	Rep	1996 - 1996	1992 - 2000
AK	House	GREEN, JOSEPH	Rep	1998 - 1998	1992 - 2000	AK	House	JAMES, JEANETTE	Rep	2000 - 2000	1992 - 2000
AK	House	COGHILL, JOHN B. JR.	Rep	2002 - 2004	1998 - 2012	AK	House	SAMUELS, RALPH	Rep	2006 - 2006	2002 - 2006
AK	House	AUSTERMAN, ALAN D.	Rep	2010 - 2010	1994 - 2012	AL	House	GUIN, KEN	Dem	2002 - 2006	1998 - 2006
AL	House	HAMMON, MICKY	Rep	2010 - 2010	2002 - 2010	AR	House	SEAWEL, HARMON	Dem	2000 - 2002	2000 - 2002
AR	House	MARTIN, JAY	Dem	2004 - 2004	2002 - 2004	AR	House	HARRELSON, STEVE	Dem	2006 - 2006	2004 - 2010
AR	House	ROEBUCK, JOHNNIE	Dem	2010 - 2010	2006 - 2010	AZ	House	DANIELS, LORI S.	Rep	1996 - 1998	1996 - 2000
AZ	House	ALLEN, CAROLYN S.	Rep	2000 - 2000	1996 - 2008	AZ	House	FARNSWORTH, EDDIE	Rep	2002 - 2002	2000 - 2012
AZ	House	TULLY, STEPHEN	Rep	2004 - 2004	2000 - 2004	AZ	House	BOONE, TOM	Rep	2006 - 2006	2002 - 2008
AZ	House	TOBIN, ANDY	Rep	2010 - 2010	2006 - 2012	CA	House	SHELLEY, KEVIN	Dem	1998 - 2000	1998 - 2000
CA	House	VARGAS, JUAN	Dem	2000 - 2000	2000 - 2010	CA	House	FROMMER, DARIO J.	Dem	2002 - 2004	2000 - 2004
CA	House	DELEON, KEVIN	Dem	2006 - 2006	2006 - 2010	CA	House	BASS, KAREN	Dem	2006 - 2006	2004 - 2008
CA	House	CALDERON, CHARLES M.	Dem	2010 - 2010	2006 - 2012	CO	House	ANDERSON, NORMA	Rep	1996 - 1996	1996 - 2002
CO	House	DEAN, DOUGLAS ALLEN (DOUG)	Rep	1998 - 1998	1996 - 2000	CO	House	SPRADLEY, LOLA	Rep	2000 - 2000	1998 - 2002
CO	House	KING, KEITH C.	Rep	2002 - 2002	1998 - 2008	CO	House	MADDEN, ALICE	Dem	2004 - 2006	2000 - 2006
CO	House	STEPHENS, AMY	Rep	2010 - 2010	2006 - 2012	CT	House	PUDLIN, DAVID B.	Dem	1998 - 2000	1998 - 2000
CT	House	AMANN, JAMES A.	Dem	2002 - 2002	1998 - 2006	CT	House	DONOVAN, CHRISTOPHER G.	Dem	2004 - 2006	1998 - 2010
CT	House	SHARKEY, J. BRENDAN	Dem	2010 - 2010	2000 - 2012	DE	House	SMITH, WAYNE A.	Rep	2000 - 2004	2000 - 2006
DE	House	CATHCART, RICHARD	Rep	2006 - 2006	2000 - 2008	DE	House	SCHWARTZKOPF, PETER C.	Dem	2010 - 2010	2002 - 2012
FL	House	MAYGARDEN, JERRY LOUIS	Rep	1998 - 2000	1998 - 2000	FL	House	RUBIO, MARCO	Rep	2002 - 2002	2000 - 2006
FL	House	GARDINER, ANDY	Rep	2004 - 2004	2000 - 2012	FL	House	HASNER, ADAM	Rep	2006 - 2006	2002 - 2008
FL	House	LOPEZCANTERA, CARLOS	Rep	2010 - 2010	2004 - 2010	GA	House	WALKER, LARRY	Dem	1996 - 2000	1996 - 2002
GA	House	SKIPPER, JIMMY	Dem	2002 - 2002	1996 - 2002	GA	House	KEEN, JERRY	Rep	2004 - 2006	2000 - 2008
GA	House	ONEAL, LARRY	Rep	2010 - 2010	2002 - 2012	HI	House	CASE, ED	Dem	1998 - 1998	1998 - 2000
HI	House	OSHIRO, MARCUS R.	Dem	2000 - 2004	1998 - 2012	HI	House	SAIKI, SCOTT K.	Dem	2002 - 2002	1998 - 2012
HI	House	CALDWELL, KIRK	Dem	2006 - 2006	2002 - 2006	HI	House	OSHIRO, BLAKE K.	Dem	2010 - 2010	2000 - 2010
IA	House	RANTS, CHRISTOPHER	Rep	1998 - 2000	1998 - 2008	IA	House	GIPP, CHUCK	Rep	2002 - 2004	1998 - 2006
IA	House	MCCARTHY, KEVIN	Dem	2006 - 2006	2002 - 2012	IA	House	UPMEYER, LINDA L.	Rep	2010 - 2010	2002 - 2012
ID	House	MONTGOMERY, GARY	Rep	1990 - 1990	1990 - 1990	ID	House	NEWCOMB, BRUCE	Rep	1992 - 1996	1990 - 2012
ID	House	BRUNEEL, FRANK C.	Rep	1998 - 2000	1994 - 2000	ID	House	DENNEY, LAWRENCE	Rep	2002 - 2004	1990 - 2004
ID	House	MOYLE, MIKE	Rep	2006 - 2010	1998 - 2012	IL	House	CURRIE, BARBARA FLYNN	Dem	1996 - 2010	1996 - 2012
IN	House	BOSMA, BRIAN C.	Rep	1994 - 1994	1994 - 2012	IN	House	SMITH, VERNON G.	Dem	1996 - 1998	1994 - 2012
IN	House	KRUZAN, MARK	Dem	1996 - 2000	1994 - 2000	IN	House	KLINKER, SHEILA	Dem	1998 - 1998	1994 - 2012
IN	House	STILWELL, RUSSELL L.	Dem	2002 - 2006	1996 - 2008	IN	House	MESSER, LUKE	Rep	2004 - 2004	2004 - 2004
IN	House	YOUNT, DAVID B.	Rep	2004 - 2004	1996 - 2004	IN	House	FRIEND, WILLIAM C.	Rep	2004 - 2010	1994 - 2012
IN	House	ROBERTSON, PAUL J.	Dem	2006 - 2006	1994 - 2008	IN	House	DERMODY, TOM	Rep	2010 - 2010	2006 - 2012
IN	House	TORR, GERALD R. (JERRY)	Rep	2010 - 2010	1996 - 2012	KS	House	JENNISON, ROBIN	Rep	1996 - 1996	1996 - 1998
KS	House	GLASSCOCK, KENT	Rep	1998 - 1998	1996 - 2000	KS	House	WEBER, SHARI	Rep	2000 - 2000	1996 - 2004
KS	House	AURAND, CLAY	Rep	2002 - 2004	1996 - 2010	KS	House	SIEGFREID, ARLEN	Rep	2010 - 2010	2002 - 2012
KY	House	STUMBO, GREGORY D.	Dem	1994 - 2000	1994 - 2012	KY	House	ADKINS, ROCKY	Dem	2002 - 2010	1994 - 2012
MA	House	NAGLE, WILLIAM P. JR.	Dem	1998 - 1998	1998 - 2000	MA	House	DIMASI, SALVATORE F.	Dem	2000 - 2002	1998 - 2008
MA	House	ROGERS, JOHN H.	Dem	2004 - 2006	1998 - 2012	MA	House	MARIANO, RONALD	Dem	2010 - 2010	1998 - 2012
MD	House	MCINTOSH, MAGGIE	Dem	1998 - 1998	1998 - 2010	MD	House	HURSON, JOHN A.	Dem	1998 - 1998	1998 - 2002
MD	House	BARVE, KUMAR P.	Dem	2002 - 2010	1998 - 2010	ME	House	KONTOS, CAROL A.	Dem	1996 - 1996	1996 - 1998
ME	House	SAXL, MICHAEL V.	Dem	1998 - 1998	1996 - 2000	ME	House	COLWELL, PATRICK	Dem	2000 - 2000	1996 - 2002
ME	House	RICHARDSON, JOHN G.	Dem	2002 - 2002	1998 - 2004	ME	House	CUMMINGS, GLENN	Dem	2004 - 2004	2000 - 2006
ME	House	PINGREE, HANNAH	Dem	2006 - 2006	2002 - 2008	ME	House	CURTIS, PHILIP M.	Rep	2010 - 2010	2004 - 2010
MI	House	THOMAS, SAMUEL BUZZ III	Dem	1996 - 1996	1996 - 2006	MI	House	GAGLIARDI, PATRICK (PAT)	Dem	1996 - 1996	1996 - 1996
MI	House	CHERRY, DEBORAH	Dem	1996 - 1996	1996 - 2006	MI	House	RACZKOWSKI, ANDREW	Rep	1998 - 1998	1996 - 2000
MI	House	MIDDAUGH, MARY	Rep	1998 - 2000	1998 - 2002	MI	House	BYL, WILLIAM	Rep	1998 - 1998	1996 - 1998
MI	House	PATTERSON, BRUCE	Rep	2000 - 2000	1998 - 2006	MI	House	RICHARDVILLE, RANDY	Rep	2002 - 2002	1998 - 2010
MI	House	KOOIMAN, JERRY	Rep	2002 - 2002	2000 - 2004	MI	House	HUIZENGA, BILL	Rep	2002 - 2002	2002 - 2006
MI	House	WARD, CHRIS	Rep	2004 - 2004	2002 - 2006	MI	House	STAKOE, JOHN	Rep	2004 - 2004	2002 - 2006
MI	House	HILDENBRAND, DAVE	Rep	2004 - 2004	2004 - 2010	MI	House	ANGERER, KATHY	Dem	2006 - 2006	2004 - 2008
MI	House	TOBOCMAN, STEVE	Dem	2006 - 2006	2002 - 2006	MI	House	GRIFFIN, MARTIN	Dem	2006 - 2006	2006 - 2008
MI	House	DEAN, ROBERT	Dem	2006 - 2006	2006 - 2008	MI	House	STAMAS, JIM	Rep	2010 - 2010	2008 - 2012
MN	House	WINTER, TED	Dem	1996 - 1996	1996 - 2000	MN	House	PAWLENTY, TIM	Rep	1998 - 2000	1996 - 2000
MN	House	PAULSEN, ERIK	Rep	2002 - 2004	1996 - 2006	MN	House	SERTICH, ANTHONY (TONY)	Dem	2006 - 2006	2000 - 2010
MO	House	BACKER, GRACIA YANCEY	Dem	1996 - 1996	1996 - 1998	MO	House	CRUMP, WAYNE	Dem	1998 - 2000	1996 - 2000
MO	House	FOLEY, JAMES MICHAEL	Dem	1998 - 2000	1996 - 2000	MO	House	CROWELL, JASON G.	Rep	2002 - 2002	2000 - 2008
MO	House	WRIGHT, MARK	Rep	2002 - 2002	1998 - 2004	MO	House	DEMPSEY, TOM	Rep	2004 - 2004	2000 - 2012
MO	House	SELF, TOM	Rep	2006 - 2006	2002 - 2008	MO	House	TILLEY, STEVEN	Rep	2006 - 2006	2004 - 2010
MO	House	JONES, TIMOTHY W.	Rep	2010 - 2010	2006 - 2012	MO	House	RIDDLE, JEANIE	Rep	2010 - 2010	2008 - 2012
MS	House	ELLIS, TYRONE	Dem	2007 - 2007	1999 - 2011						

Table A.11 – Majority Leaders of State Houses.

State	Chamber	Name	Party	Leader Period	Sample Period	State	Chamber	Name	Party	Leader Period	Sample Period
MT	House	DRISCOLL, JERRY L.	Dem	1990 - 1990	1990 - 1992	MT	House	GRINDE, LARRY HAL	Rep	1992 - 1998	1990 - 1998
MT	House	MOOD, DOUGLAS	Rep	2000 - 2000	1996 - 2002	MT	House	BROWN, ROY	Rep	2002 - 2002	1998 - 2006
MT	House	HIMMELBERGER, DENNIS	Rep	2006 - 2006	2000 - 2008	MT	House	MCGILLVRAY, TOM	Rep	2010 - 2010	2004 - 2010
NC	House	DAUGHTRY, N. LEO	Rep	1996 - 1996	1996 - 2012	NC	House	BADDOUR, PHIL JR.	Dem	1998 - 2000	1996 - 2000
NC	House	HACKNEY, JOE	Dem	2004 - 2004	1996 - 2010	NC	House	HOLLIMAN, L. HUGH	Dem	2006 - 2006	2000 - 2008
NC	House	STAM, PAUL JR.	Rep	2010 - 2010	2002 - 2012	ND	House	DORSO, JOHN	Rep	1998 - 1998	1998 - 1998
ND	House	BELTER, WESLEY	Rep	2000 - 2000	1998 - 2012	ND	House	BERG, RICHARD	Rep	2002 - 2006	1998 - 2006
ND	House	CARLSON, AL	Rep	2010 - 2010	1998 - 2010	NH	House		Other	1998 - 1998	1998 - 2012
NH	House		Rep	2002 - 2002	1998 - 2012	NH	House		Rep	2004 - 2004	1998 - 2004
NH	House	WALLNER, MARY JANE	Dem	2006 - 2006	1998 - 2012	NH	House	BETTENCOURT, DAVID J.	Rep	2010 - 2010	2004 - 2010
NJ	House	DIGAETANO, PAUL	Rep	1997 - 1999	1997 - 2003	NJ	House	ROBERTS, JOSEPH J. JR.	Dem	2001 - 2003	1997 - 2007
NJ	House	WATSONCOLEMAN, BONNIE	Dem	2005 - 2005	1997 - 2007	NJ	House	CRYAN, JOSEPH	Dem	2009 - 2009	2001 - 2011
NM	House	OLGUIN, MICHAEL	Dem	1992 - 1996	1992 - 1996	NM	House	LUJAN, BEN	Dem	1998 - 1998	1992 - 2010
NM	House	PICRAUX, DENICE R.	Dem	2000 - 2002	1992 - 2010	NM	House	MARTINEZ, W. KEN	Dem	2004 - 2010	1998 - 2012
NV	House	PORTER, GENE	Dem	1990 - 1990	1990 - 1992	NV	House	BUCKLEY, BARBARA	Dem	1996 - 2004	1994 - 2008
NV	House	PERKINS, RICHARD	Dem	1996 - 1998	1992 - 2004	NV	House	PARKS, DAVID	Dem	2000 - 2000	1996 - 2012
NV	House	OHRENSCHALL, GENIE	Dem	2002 - 2002	1994 - 2004	NV	House	OCEGUERA, JOHN	Dem	2002 - 2006	2000 - 2010
NV	House	CONKLIN, MARCUS	Dem	2006 - 2010	2002 - 2010	NV	House	KIRKPATRICK, MARILYN	Dem	2010 - 2010	2004 - 2012
NY	House	BRAGMAN, MICHAEL J.	Other	1998 - 1998	1998 - 2000	NY	House	TOKASZ, PAUL A.	Dem	2000 - 2004	1998 - 2012
NY	House	CANESTRARI, RONALD J.	Dem	2006 - 2010	1998 - 2010	OH	House	TIBERI, PAT	Rep	1996 - 1998	1996 - 1998
OH	House	GARDNER, RANDALL	Rep	1996 - 1996	1996 - 2012	OH	House	BUCHY, JIM	Rep	1998 - 1998	1996 - 2012
OH	House	CLANCY, PATRICIA M.	Rep	2000 - 2002	1996 - 2004	OH	House	BUEHRER, STEPHEN	Rep	2000 - 2002	1998 - 2010
OH	House	FLOWERS, LARRY	Rep	2004 - 2006	2000 - 2006	OH	House	DEWINE, KEVIN	Rep	2004 - 2004	2000 - 2006
OH	House	CARMICHAEL, JIM	Rep	2006 - 2006	2000 - 2006	OH	House	HUFFMAN, MATT	Rep	2010 - 2010	2006 - 2012
OH	House	SEARS, BARBARA	Rep	2010 - 2010	2008 - 2012	OK	House	ROACH, RUSS	Dem	2000 - 2000	2000 - 2000
OK	House	HUTCHISON, JOE J.	Dem	2000 - 2002	2000 - 2002	OK	House	TURNER, DALE	Dem	2000 - 2000	2000 - 2006
OK	House	COVEY, JAMES E.	Dem	2000 - 2002	2000 - 2006	OK	House	MCCARTER, RAYMOND G.	Dem	2000 - 2000	2000 - 2006
OK	House	EASLEY, MARY	Dem	2000 - 2000	2000 - 2006	OK	House	HILLIARD, DANNY	Dem	2000 - 2000	2000 - 2002
OK	House	ASKINS, JARI	Dem	2000 - 2002	2000 - 2004	OK	House	NATIONS, BILL	Dem	2000 - 2000	2000 - 2008
OK	House	RICE, LARRY	Dem	2002 - 2002	2000 - 2002	OK	House	KIRBY, RON	Dem	2002 - 2002	2000 - 2002
OK	House	LINDLEY, AL	Dem	2002 - 2002	2000 - 2006	OK	House	ROBERTS, LARRY D. 1	Dem	2002 - 2002	2000 - 2002
OK	House	DORMAN, JOE	Dem	2002 - 2002	2002 - 2012	OK	House	SWEEDEN, JOE L.	Dem	2002 - 2002	2000 - 2006
OK	House	ROGGOW, CURT	Rep	2004 - 2004	2000 - 2004	OK	House	LIOTTA, MARK	Rep	2004 - 2004	2000 - 2004
OK	House	TREBILCOCK, JOHN	Rep	2004 - 2004	2002 - 2012	OK	House	SMALIGO, JOHN M.	Rep	2004 - 2004	2000 - 2004
OK	House	CARGILL, LANCE	Rep	2004 - 2004	2000 - 2006	OK	House	NEWPORT, JIM	Rep	2004 - 2004	2000 - 2004
OK	House	JONES, TAD	Rep	2004 - 2004	2000 - 2008	OK	House	SULLIVAN, DANIEL S.	Rep	2006 - 2006	2004 - 2010
OK	House	PIATT, GREG A.	Rep	2006 - 2006	2000 - 2006	OK	House	DENNEY, LEE	Rep	2006 - 2006	2004 - 2012
OK	House	TERRILL, RANDY	Rep	2006 - 2006	2004 - 2010	OK	House	JACKSON, MIKE	Rep	2006 - 2006	2004 - 2012
OK	House	INGMIRE, TERRY	Rep	2006 - 2006	2000 - 2006	OK	House	DEWITT, DALE R.	Rep	2010 - 2010	2002 - 2012
OR	House	WALDEN, GREG	Rep	1990 - 1990	1990 - 1992	OR	House	CLARNO, BEVERLY A.	Rep	1992 - 1992	1992 - 2000
OR	House	LUNDQUIST, LYNN R.	Rep	1994 - 1994	1994 - 1998	OR	House	SNODGRASS, LYNN	Rep	1996 - 1996	1994 - 1998
OR	House	HARPER, STEVE	Rep	1998 - 1998	1996 - 2000	OR	House	MINNIS, KAREN	Rep	2000 - 2000	1998 - 2006
OR	House	SCOTT, WAYNE	Rep	2002 - 2004	2002 - 2006	OR	House	HUNT, DAVE	Dem	2006 - 2006	2002 - 2010
PA	House	PERZEL, JOHN M.	Rep	1998 - 2000	1998 - 2008	PA	House	SMITH, SAM	Rep	2002 - 2004	1998 - 2012
PA	House	DEWEESE, H. WILLIAM	Dem	2006 - 2006	1998 - 2010	PA	House	TURZAI, MIKE	Rep	2010 - 2010	2002 - 2012
RI	House	CARUOLO, GEORGE D.	Dem	1994 - 1996	1994 - 1996	RI	House	MARTINEAU, GERARD M.	Dem	1998 - 2000	1994 - 2000
RI	House	FOX, GORDON	Dem	2002 - 2006	1994 - 2012	RI	House	MATTIELLO, NICHOLAS ANTHONY	Dem	2010 - 2010	2006 - 2012
SC	House	HARRELL, ROBERT W. JR.	Rep	1996 - 1996	1996 - 2012	SC	House	QUINN, RICHARD M. JR.	Rep	1998 - 2002	1996 - 2002
SC	House	MERRILL, JAMES H.	Rep	2004 - 2006	2000 - 2012	SC	House	BINGHAM, KENNY	Rep	2010 - 2010	2000 - 2012
SD	House	PETERSON, BILL	Rep	2000 - 2002	2000 - 2002	SD	House	RHODEN, LARRY	Rep	2004 - 2006	2000 - 2010
SD	House	LUST, DAVID	Rep	2010 - 2010	2006 - 2012	TN	House	HARGROVE, JERE L.	Dem	1996 - 1998	1996 - 2004
TN	House	DAVIDSON, EUGENE	Dem	2000 - 2000	1996 - 2004	TN	House	MCMLLIAN, KIM A.	Dem	2002 - 2004	1996 - 2004
TN	House	ODOM, GARY	Dem	2006 - 2006	1996 - 2012	TN	House	MCCORMICK, GERALD	Rep	2010 - 2010	2004 - 2012
UT	House	BISHOP, ROB	Rep	1990 - 1990	1990 - 1990	UT	House	FOX, CHRISTINE	Rep	1996 - 1996	1990 - 1996
UT	House	GARN, KEVIN S.	Rep	1998 - 2000	1990 - 2008	UT	House	CURTIS, GREG J.	Rep	2002 - 2002	1996 - 2006
UT	House	ALEXANDER, JEFF	Rep	2004 - 2004	1990 - 2006	UT	House	CLARK, DAVID	Rep	2006 - 2006	2000 - 2010
UT	House	DEE, BRAD	Rep	2010 - 2010	2004 - 2012	VA	House	GRIFFITH, H. MORGAN	Rep	1999 - 2007	1999 - 2009
VA	House	COX, M. KIRKLAND (KIRK)	Rep	2009 - 2009	1999 - 2011	VT	House	TRACY, JOHN PATRICK	Dem	1998 - 1998	1998 - 2004
VT	House	LABARGE, JOHN V.	Rep	2000 - 2000	1998 - 2000	VT	House	HOUSTON, CONNIE T.	Rep	2002 - 2002	1998 - 2004
VT	House	PARTRIDGE, CAROLYN W.	Dem	2004 - 2006	1998 - 2012	VT	House	LERICHE, LUCY	Dem	2010 - 2010	2004 - 2010
WA	House	EBERSOLE, BRIAN	Dem	1990 - 1990	1990 - 1994	WA	House	PEERY, W. KIM 1	Dem	1992 - 1992	1990 - 1992
WA	House	FOREMAN, DALE	Rep	1994 - 1994	1992 - 1994	WA	House	LISK, BARB	Rep	1996 - 1996	1990 - 2000
WA	House	KESSLER, LYNN	Dem	2000 - 2006	1992 - 2008	WA	House	SULLIVAN, PAT	Dem	2010 - 2010	2004 - 2012
WI	House	FOTI, STEVEN M.	Rep	1998 - 2002	1998 - 2002	WI	House	HUEBSCH, MICHAEL D.	Rep	2004 - 2004	1998 - 2010
WI	House	FITZGERALD, JEFF	Rep	2006 - 2006	2000 - 2010	WI	House	SUDER, SCOTT	Rep	2010 - 2010	1998 - 2012
WV	House	MARTIN, J. E.	Dem	1998 - 1998	1998 - 2000	WV	House	STATON, W. RICHARD (RICK)	Dem	2000 - 2004	1998 - 2004
WV	House	DELONG, JOE	Dem	2006 - 2006	2000 - 2006	WV	House	BOGGS, BRENT	Dem	2010 - 2010	1998 - 2012
WY	House	CHAMBERLAIN, DOUGLAS W.	Rep	1990 - 1990	1990 - 1992	WY	House	MARTON, JOHN P.	Rep	1992 - 1992	1990 - 1994
WY	House	HINCHEY, BRUCE A.	Rep	1994 - 1994	1990 - 1998	WY	House	BEBOUT, ELI	Rep	1996 - 1996	1990 - 2008
WY	House	TEMPEST, RICK	Rep	1998 - 1998	1990 - 2000	WY	House	PARADY, FRED	Rep	2000 - 2000	1994 - 2002
WY	House	LUTHI, RANDALL B.	Rep	2002 - 2002	1994 - 2004	WY	House	COHEE, ROY	Rep	2004 - 2004	1998 - 2008
WY	House	SIMPSON, COLIN M.	Rep	2006 - 2006	1998 - 2008	WY	House	LUBNAU, THOMAS E. II	Rep	2010 - 2010	2004 - 2012

A.2.2 Robustness to Definitions of the Leadership Variable

In the paper we define leadership to include the following positions: Speaker of the House/Assembly, President Pro Tempore of the Senate, Majority Leader (Senate or House), and Majority Floor Leader (Senate or House).

Here we offer estimates with three alternative definitions in order to probe the robustness of the findings and to see which offices appear to drive the results. For brevity's sake we only present results using logged interest-group contributions, our main outcome of interest.

In the first column of Table A.12, we remove Majority Leader from the list of offices included above. In the second column, we remove President Pro Tempore from the list of offices. In the final column, we include all of the offices from the original definition and we also add in Speaker Pro Tempore. In all three cases, effects continue to be large and positive.

Table A.12 – Effect of Attaining Party Leadership on Campaign Contributions: Using Different Leadership Codings.

	No Majority Leader	No President Pro Tem	Adding Speaker Pro Tem
	Log Group Contributions (\$)	Log Group Contributions (\$)	Log Group Contributions (\$)
Majority-Party Leader	0.63 (0.10)	0.49 (0.07)	0.43 (0.07)
Intercept	8.68 (0.20)	8.68 (0.20)	8.69 (0.20)
N	36,875	36,875	36,875
Individual Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses.

A.3 Additional Statistical Results

In this section we provide additional regression tables referenced in the body of the paper.

A.3.1 Legislature Size, Controlling for State Population

First, we re-estimate the regression evaluating the effect of leadership across legislature size, adding in a control for state population, and interacting this with the leader variable as well. We continue to find that the effect of leadership grows markedly with the (log) number of seats in the legislature, but not with the size of the majority or the population of the state.

Finally, in Table A.14, we show that the findings do not depend on whether we estimate the effects in a single or two separate regressions.

Table A.13 – Effect of Attaining Majority-Party Leadership on Campaign Contributions Across Membership and Majority Sizes of Legislatures.
Majority-party leaders are more powerful in large legislatures.

	Log Group Contributions (\$)	Log Total Contributions (\$)	Log Individual Contributions (\$)
Leader \times Log(Total Seats)	0.16 (0.09)	0.10 (0.09)	0.12 (0.12)
Leader \times Log(Majority Seats)	0.04 (0.06)	0.03 (0.06)	0.02 (0.07)
Log(Total Seats)	-0.46 (0.21)	-0.76 (0.12)	-0.74 (0.12)
Log(Majority Seats)	-0.07 (0.04)	-0.08 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)
Log(Population)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Leader \times Log(Population)	0.08 (0.06)	0.07 (0.06)	0.02 (0.09)
Majority-Party Leader	-1.44 (0.95)	-1.03 (0.99)	-0.27 (1.45)
Intercept	11.22 (0.97)	13.97 (0.53)	12.13 (0.53)
N	36,182	36,182	36,182
Individual Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses.

Table A.14 – Effect of Attaining Majority-Party Leadership on Campaign Contributions Across Membership and Majority Sizes of Legislatures. Majority-party leaders are more powerful in large legislatures.

	Log Group Contributions (\$)	Log Total Contributions (\$)	Log Individual Contributions (\$)
Leader × Log(Total Seats)	0.22 (0.10)	0.16 (0.09)	0.14 (0.13)
Leader × Majority (%)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Log(Total Seats)	-0.53 (0.22)	-0.84 (0.11)	-0.79 (0.12)
Majority Majority (%)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Majority-Party Leader	-0.51 (0.41)	-0.30 (0.41)	-0.08 (0.60)
Intercept	11.32 (1.01)	14.20 (0.50)	12.15 (0.55)
N	36,818	36,818	36,818
Individual Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses.

A.3.2 Effect of Leadership Conditional on Procedural Rules

Next, we offer the formal estimation results concerning the way the effect of leadership varies along with the specific procedural powers that leaders are granted in different states. As the table shows, we find a large effect of the interaction with “Refer”—indicating that leaders may be more powerful when they have the power to refer bills to committees. However, as mentioned in the paper, we cannot reject the null of no effect. Interactions for the other rules are small and imprecisely estimated.

Table A.15 – Effect of Attaining Majority-Party Leadership on Campaign Contributions across Various Institutional Rules. Majority-party leaders are more powerful in when institutions grant them authority to control the process of referring bills to committees.

	Log Group Contributions (\$)	Log Total Contributions (\$)	Log Individual Contributions (\$)
Majority-Party Leader	0.31 (0.09)	0.34 (0.09)	0.46 (0.13)
Leader × Refer	0.43 (0.19)	0.13 (0.16)	0.24 (0.21)
Leader × Agenda	-0.14 (0.14)	-0.15 (0.14)	-0.34 (0.19)
Leader × Appoint	-0.09 (0.20)	0.16 (0.17)	0.17 (0.20)
Refer	-0.52 (0.22)	-0.34 (0.24)	-0.63 (0.17)
Agenda	0.03 (0.16)	0.42 (0.20)	0.25 (0.16)
Appoint	0.04 (0.33)	-0.49 (0.35)	-0.16 (0.19)
Intercept	9.23 (0.07)	10.62 (0.10)	8.88 (0.08)
N	36,001	36,001	36,001
Individual Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses.

A.3.3 Effects Across Intraparty Homogeneity

In the paper, we estimate the effects of leadership across levels of legislative polarization in order to test a key prediction from the theoretical literature on parties. One of the main theories in this literature, Conditional Party Government, makes predictions not just about polarization but about the degree to which members of the majority party agree on policy—what they call intraparty homogeneity.

In this section, we look for variation in the effects of leadership across levels of intraparty homogeneity, using the same specification as in the paper. To measure homogeneity, we extract the standard deviation of the contribution-based Bonica scores within the majority party, by state and year. Table ?? presents the results. We again see now evidence that leadership power is increasing with homogeneity; if anything, the positive interaction coefficient indicates that leaders are slightly

Table A.16 – Effect of Attaining Majority-Party Leadership on Campaign Contributions Across Levels of Intraparty Homogeneity. The negative and statistically insignificant coefficients on the interaction terms suggest that majority leaders are *not* more powerful in more or less cohesive majority parties.

	Log Group Contributions (\$)	Log Total Contributions (\$)	Log Individual Contributions (\$)
Majority-Party Leader	0.45 (0.06)	0.45 (0.06)	0.56 (0.09)
Leader × Heterogeneity	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.06)
Polarization	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Intercept	8.82 (0.00)	10.22 (0.00)	8.48 (0.00)
N	35,045	35,045	35,045
Individual Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. Polarization standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1.

more powerful when the standard deviation—measuring heterogeneity—is larger. But we cannot reject the null of no difference.

A.3.4 Effects on Pre-Session Group Donations

In this section, we show that leaders receive sizable donations immediately following the general election. Table A.17 reports the estimated value of leadership on donations from groups in November (after the 8th) and December following the general election. The positive and statistically significant results indicate that donors target leaders even before they assume office.

Table A.17 – Effect of Attaining Party Leadership on Pre-session Campaign Contributions. Interest groups target money towards leader before the legislative session starts.

	November log(Contributions (\$))	December log(Contributions (\$))	Nov.+Dec. log(Contributions (\$))
Majority-Party Leader	0.23 (0.08)	0.30 (0.07)	0.30 (0.10)
N	36,875	36,875	36,875
Individual Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses.

A.3.5 Measuring Polarization Using Roll-Call Votes

We also estimate both of our polarization analyses with an alternative measure of polarization. Instead of using CFScores, here we use polarization as measured by Shor and McCarty, on the basis of state legislative roll-call votes. Specifically, each chamber-year’s polarization is measured as the difference in average roll-call ideology across the two parties.

The interactive specification results are highly similar to those reported in the paper with CFScores. The results using the percentage of money flowing to the leader are slightly larger in magnitude; however, the effect continues to be small (a full two standard-deviation increase in polarization, which spans most of the range of the polarization measure, corresponds to a 6 percentage-point increase in the share of money going to the leader. And we cannot reject the null of no effect.

A.3.6 Effects Larger In Legislatures Without Term Limits

There a variety of reasons to suspect that legislative leaders are less powerful when they and their members face term limits. In these settings, leaders cannot make long-term promises to members, and leaders cannot look forward to long time horizons in power. Donors, too, are likely to view their investments as less valuable when the time horizon is shorter. While the results in the paper average over states that do and do not have term limits (and most states do not), here we present evidence that the effect does vary in the expected direction. In term limited states the effect of taking power is roughly cut in half, although estimates are not super precise.

Table A.18 – Effect of Attaining Majority-Party Leadership on Campaign Contributions Across Levels of Polarization.

	Log Group Contributions (\$)	Log Total Contributions (\$)	Log Individual Contributions (\$)
Majority-Party Leader	0.47 (0.07)	0.47 (0.06)	0.53 (0.09)
Leader \times Polarization	-0.13 (0.09)	-0.08 (0.10)	-0.09 (0.13)
Polarization	0.10 (0.16)	-0.06 (0.11)	-0.06 (0.14)
Intercept	8.81 (0.13)	9.89 (0.09)	7.93 (0.11)
N	33,075	33,075	33,075
Individual Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. Polarization standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1.

Table A.19 – Effect of Polarization on Share of Money Going to Majority-Party Leader.

	Pct of Group \$ (0–100)	Pct of Total \$ (0–100)	Pct of Individual \$ (0–100)
Polarization	-0.12 (1.27)	0.37 (1.23)	1.03 (2.24)
N	703	703	703
State-Chamber Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. Polarization standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1.

A.3.7 Effects Larger When Majority-Party Status Changes

The overall effects presented in the paper average overall several ways in which individuals can become majority-party leaders. One way is for a minority party leader’s party to become the majority. Another main way is for the identity of the leader to change, holding majority-party status constant. We have no strong a priori reasons to expect one type of change to be more or less important than the other. Nevertheless, in this section we interact the treatment with an indicator for individual i ’s party being the majority in the previous legislative session. As the coefficients show, the effect of leadership appears to be especially large in cases where the majority party

Table A.20 – Effect of Attaining Majority-Party Leadership on Campaign Contributions Across Term-Limited and Non Term-Limited States. Term limits appear to reduce the power of majority-party leaders.

	Log Group Contributions (\$)	Log Total Contributions (\$)	Log Individual Contributions (\$)
Majority-Party Leader	0.52 (0.08)	0.50 (0.08)	0.60 (0.11)
Leader \times Limit	-0.29 (0.18)	-0.21 (0.13)	-0.25 (0.18)
Limit	-0.04 (0.16)	0.01 (0.10)	-0.06 (0.15)
Intercept	8.69 (0.20)	9.97 (0.19)	7.87 (0.29)
N	36,875	36,875	36,875
Individual Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses.

changes. The effect is still very large, but smaller than this, for cases where majority-party status is held constant and leadership identity changes.

Table A.21 – Previous Majority Status.

	Log Group Contributions (\$)	Log Total Contributions (\$)	Log Individual Contributions (\$)
Leader \times Majority $_{i,t-1}$	-0.17 (0.08)	-0.14 (0.10)	0.02 (0.10)
Majority $_{i,t-1}$	0.08 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.05 (0.03)
Majority-Party Leader	0.60 (0.08)	0.56 (0.10)	0.54 (0.11)
Intercept	8.85 (0.02)	10.21 (0.02)	8.41 (0.02)
N	36,565	36,565	36,565
Individual Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-Year Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes

Robust standard errors clustered by state in parentheses.